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ABSTRACT 
Persistence in Consumer Search 
Nicholas Reinholtz 
 
In this dissertation, I explore determinants, and some consequences, of persistence in 
consumer search. Many prominent thinkers have considered the problem of search in 
terms of optimal solutions (e.g., Stigler 1961) or their heuristic approximations (e.g., 
Simon 1955). In the following research, I explore persistence in search not merely as a 
function of economic calibration, but rather as an outcome determined by both cognitive 
and motivational processes. I provide evidence that normative models of search are 
insufficient to explain the behavior of those whom I study. Instead, I show cases in which 
search persistence is a function of prior behavior (Chapter 1) and prior beliefs (Chapter 
2). I further propose a cognitive model of price search behavior (Chapter 3) that can 
predict many of the observed behaviors that would be considered mistakes in normative 
price search frameworks (e.g., variance neglect, reference point effects, local contrast 
effects). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Consumers are searchers. We look for new and interesting products. We hunt for the 
best prices on products we want to buy. We explore new retailers, restaurants, and 
services. We consume information that will help us make better purchase decisions. All 
of these behaviors can be classified, to some extent, as consumer search. In this 
dissertation, I examine persistence in consumer search. More concretely, I look for 
factors that cause consumers to search more or less. 
 Previous research — particularly that done by economists — has looked 
extensively at how consumers should search (e.g., Stigler 1961) or, alternatively, for 
theoretical explanations of empirical phenomena related to search (e.g., Baye, Morgan, 
and Scholten 2004). More recently, researchers have begun to examine psychological 
factors that influence consumer search behavior (e.g., Brucks 1985). I attempt to extend 
the current understanding of consumer search by focusing specifically on the consumer’s 
decision (often implicit) to continue or terminate search. 
 In chapter 1, I look at situations in which a consumer has to search for many 
things sequentially. I find that consumers adapt their search strategy based on the 
difficulty of the first decision, but tend to insufficiently update this strategy to account 
for the difficulty of subsequent decisions. This strategy “stickiness” leads to differences in 
aggregate search based on decision order: When decisions are ordered from easiest to 
most difficult consumers search more (in total) than when decisions are ordered from 
most difficult to easiest. I further examine the boundary conditions of this effect and find 
that simple interventions — making neighboring decisions more distinct or providing 
short breaks between decisions — can attenuate search strategy carryover and mitigate 
the differences in search persistence caused by task order. 
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 In chapter 2, I look at persistence in consumer price search — situations in which 
a consumer is looking for an acceptable price for an item (or service) she wants to 
purchase. I compare the normative prescriptions from economic models of price search 
to actual consumer behavior and find several inconsistencies. Most importantly, I find 
that consumers tend to search less when price dispersion is greater whereas profit-
maximizing models of consumer price search suggest they should instead search more 
when price dispersion is greater. I also find that the average cost of a product influences 
persistence in consumer search: Consumers persist longer at search for higher priced 
products whereas economic models suggest the average price should be an 
inconsequential factor. I propose that both of these effects are caused consumer 
inferences about price dispersion: For a given price (or average price) consumers form 
an expectation about the degree of price dispersion and insufficiently update this belief 
during their search. 
 In chapter 3, I describe a process model of consumer price search. The model is 
intended to be cognitively plausible. In other words, it supposes processes and 
representations that fall within the computational and mnemonic capacities of a typical 
human decision maker. At the core of the model is the notion that expected price 
dispersion is represented by a finite sample of possible prices (as opposed to a 
continuous probability distribution). Importantly, the proposed model can account for 
many observed behaviors in price search that are inconsistent with normative search 
theory (e.g. variance neglect, reference price effects, and local contrast effects). 
 In aggregate, the three chapters that follow offer new insights regarding the 
determinants of persistence in consumer search. In concert, they promote the view of a 
boundedly rational consumer who exploits her prior knowledge to make frugal 
approximations of normative behavior. Instead of basing persistence decisions on real-
time cost-benefit calculations, a consumer is guided by her prior behavior in similar 
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situations (Chapter 1) and her prior experience in the commercial marketplace (Chapter 
2). These heuristics typically serve the consumer well, but — in certain situations — can 
lead to over- or under-persistence relative to her underlying preferences. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Task Order Influences Persistence in Consumer Search 
 
Consumers frequently engage in sequential decisions. For instance, grocery store 
shoppers fill their shopping baskets one item at a time, restaurant diners order their 
meal one course at a time, and computer buyers configure their laptops one component 
at a time. Each decision in the sequence might require choosing from a different number 
of options. Imagine that a homeowner who renovates her apartment engages in a 
sequence of decision steps: She might have to choose between 50 different tiles, 20 
different wall paint colors, and five different wallpaper designs. In this chapter I explore 
how the order of the decisions — their sequential nature — influences the extent to which 
consumers persist at search for each individual decision. 
 Order is important in many contexts, from impression formation (Asch 1946) to 
judgments of hedonic experiences (Ariely and Zauberman 2000). However, previous 
research about order in consumer search has limited its focus to the effect of ordering 
options within a specific choice set (e.g., Dellaert and Häubl 2012; Dellaert and 
Stremersch 2005; Diehl 2005; Diehl, Kornish, and Lynch 2003; Häubl, Dellaert, and 
Donkers 2010). The relationship between decision order and consumer search has, to 
this point, remained unexplored (note: parts of this investigation overlap with Levav, 
Reinholtz, and Lin 2012). 
 Although there are many variables by which decisions can be ordered, the current 
investigation focuses on ordering decisions by their difficulty. In Studies 1.1 and 1.2, I 
operationalize decision difficulty as choice-set size. Besides being a variable of high 
managerial relevance, previous research has suggested that choice-set size can exert a 
substantial influence on consumers’ psychology and consequently on their decisions. For 
example, large choice sets may demotivate purchases (Iyengar and Lepper 2000) or lead 
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to decision simplification (Iyengar and Kamenica 2010). When people are given a large 
choice set, they may be less likely to make a purchase than when they are given a small 
choice set. Further, choice-set size may affect decision confidence and preference 
strength (Chernev 2003). Finally, varying a configuration sequence by choice-set size can 
change people’s ultimate product choice, even in high-stakes decisions such as 
automobile purchases (Levav et al. 2010). In Study 1.3, I take a different approach and 
use an information search task in which difficulty is operationalized as the effort 
required to make a decision with certainty. 
 It is well known that consumers are adaptive decision makers whose decision 
strategies are contingent on features of the decision environment (Payne 1976; Payne, 
Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Simonson and Tversky 1992). In particular, people’s 
cognitive limitations lead them to seek ways to simplify otherwise difficult decisions. For 
instance, cognitive constraints can drive people to simplify difficult decisions by 
adopting a satisficing strategy (identifying an acceptable item in a choice set), rather 
than a maximizing strategy (identifying the best option in a choice set; Simon 1955; 
1956), as a way to limit their decision effort and thus conserve their cognitive resources 
(Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988). 
 Most of the prior experimental evidence regarding decision difficulty and 
adaptive decision-making has been limited to one-shot decisions. However, in many 
purchase situations (e.g., configuration decisions) consumers make a sequence of 
multiple decisions, rather than a single decision on its own. Suppose our homeowner 
from the example above begins the sequential process of renovation decisions by 
choosing from a small set of five wallpaper designs (a fairly easy decision). Previous 
research suggests that she would search a high proportion of the alternatives (Diehl 
2005; Meyer 1997), presumably with a greater desire to maximize her choice outcome. 
What happens when she moves to a more difficult subsequent decision in which she 
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must choose from a larger set of options (e.g., 20 wall paint colors)? Will she adapt to the 
more difficult environment by altering her search strategies, perhaps by adopting a 
satisficing heuristic?    
 Research on problem solving suggests that our homeowner might adapt her 
initial strategy based on the requirements of the first decision problem, but persist in 
using the same strategy in subsequent decisions regardless of its suitability. Classic 
demonstrations of Einstellung in problem solving indicate that once people learn a rule 
for successfully solving an initial series of problems, they frequently continue to apply 
this rule to later problems as well, even when easier rules are obvious. In Abraham 
Luchins’s (1942) water-jug experiment, participants were asked to measure out a given 
amount of water using a combination of three jugs of various capacities. The practice 
trials consisted of problems that required a relatively complicated solution. In the target 
problem, even though there was a simpler solution that was easily detectable by control 
participants who had not engaged in practice trials, participants in the treatment group 
persisted in using the complicated solution. 
 Similarly, in the consumer domain, studies show that context-driven decision 
rules can persist even after the initial context is removed (Amir and Levav 2008; Häubl 
and Murray 2003). Broder and Schiffer’s (2006) studies on sequential stock-market 
decisions show that once people adopt a decision strategy, they tend to persist with that 
strategy even when the decision environment changes and the strategy yields 
economically suboptimal outcomes. The tendency to retain response patterns, even when 
they cease to be beneficial, has been termed “behavioral stereotypy” (Schwartz 1982). In 
sum, prior research suggests that the initial search strategy used by a consumer may be 
“sticky,” persisting in later decisions. 
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Boiling a Frog 
 
“If a frog jumps into a pot of boiling water, it jumps right out again, 
because it senses the danger. But the very same frog, if it jumps into a pot 
of lukewarm water that is slowly brought to a boil, will just sit there and it 
won't move. It will just sit there even as the temperature continues to go 
up and up.” -Al Gore, An Inconvenient Truth (2006) 
 
In this chapter, I argue that decision makers are much like the frog in the adage 
mentioned above. The frog forms an accurate initial impression of the water — either 
temperate or too hot — and adopts a reasonable strategy accordingly. If the water is 
boiling, the frog adopts a “get out” strategy. If the water is pleasantly warm, the frog 
adopts a “hang out” strategy. Both strategies are sensible — the boiling water should be 
avoided and the warm water should be enjoyed. The problem arises when the 
temperature of the lukewarm water is increased slowly: The frog's “hang out” strategy 
persists to the point where it is detrimental and the frog, unfortunately, becomes cooked. 
(It is worth noting that this adage is likely false, although a surprising number of living 
frogs have been boiled in the name of science; cf. Sedgwick 1888.) 
 Similarly, I argue, decision makers faced with a single choice are quite adaptive in 
choosing a reasonable strategy for behavior. If a decision is comparatively easy, such as 
choice between only a few products, a consumer will likely explore each option in some 
detail (i.e., a maximizing strategy). The problem again arises when the initial decision is 
succeeded by other decisions that are similar in some ways, but feature critical 
differences. The strategy adopted in the first decision might persist to these subsequent 
decisions, but might no longer be appropriate (or at least consistent with the decision 
maker's goals). For example, when the easy decision described above is followed by a 
more difficult decision — a choice between 30 products, for example — the previously 
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cited research suggests that the initial strategy of diligent search might persist. Whereas 
a decision maker who encounters this more difficult problem without the sequential 
context would be more likely to adopt a less diligent strategy (i.e., a satisficing strategy), 
which she would find more appropriate for the task. 
 Critical to the frog-in-boiling-water metaphor is the notion of gradual change. 
When the water temperature is raised quickly, the frog is likely to notice the increase and 
escape the soon-to-be-boiling water. Similarly — I argue — a human decision maker 
confronted with a significant change in the decision environment is more likely to 
reevaluate her decision strategy. This possibility is supported by research on learning, 
person perception, and confirmatory processing, which demonstrates that people tend 
not to update their beliefs unless they encounter a salient failure of their initial 
hypothesis (Hastie and Kumar 1979; Hoch 1984; Hoch and Ha 1986; Srull, Lichtenstein, 
and Rothbart 1985). I examine this notion in the context of sequential decisions. I 
predict that more salient changes in task difficulty will increase the likelihood that 
consumers update their previously adopted decision strategies. 
 
 
Overview of Empirical Evidence 
 
In this chapter, I explore the notion of gradual change in the context of sequential 
decisions. In Study 1.1, I show that gradual changes can indeed lead to strategy 
persistence. When a decision maker starts with an easy decision, she is more likely to 
adopt a maximizing strategy in which she searches diligently through the available 
options. When the first easy decision is followed by similar, but more difficult decisions, 
she continues to apply this strategy of searching diligently. In contrast, when a decision 
maker starts with a more difficult decision, she is likely to adopt a satisficing strategy in 
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which she searches less comprehensively. When the first difficult decision is followed by 
similar, but easier decisions, she continues to apply this satisficing strategy. 
 The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to examining boundary conditions for 
this frog-in-boiling-water effect. In a “bonus” task in Study 1.1, I show that the influence 
of a previously adopted strategy can indeed persist (to a degree) in a procedurally 
unrelated decision problem. In Study 1.2, I examine the gradient of change in the 
decision environment and show that bigger differences in the characteristics of the 
sequential decisions lead to less strategy persistence. Relating this to the frog metaphor: 
When the temperature of the water increases too quickly, the frog is more likely to notice 
the difference and adopt its decision strategy accordingly (i.e., it will jump out of the 
soon-to-be boiling water). Finally, in Study 1.3, I examine whether brief interruptions — 
a chance for participants to disengage from the decision sequence and perhaps think 
about the changing environment — attenuate strategy persistence. I find that interrupted 




Study 1.1: Ordering Decisions by Choice Set Size Influences Search Persistence 
 
In this study, I examine the basic frog-in-boiling-water effect. I manipulate a sequence of 
decisions between participants so they are ordered either easiest-to-hardest or hardest-
to-easiest. When the easiest decision comes first, I predict that participants will adopt a 
diligent/maximizing decision strategy and search through the available products 
extensively. Conversely, when the hardest decision comes first, I predict that participants 
will adopt a less-diligent/satisficing decision strategy and search through the available 
products more limitedly. Importantly, because the sequential decisions are similar, I 
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predict that the initial strategy a consumer adopts will persist to later decisions. I test for 
this by looking at aggregate differences in search behavior across the entire sequence of 
decisions. If participants in the easiest-to-hardest condition indeed adopt a more 
thorough decision strategy that persists to later decisions, these participants should 
search more in aggregate across all of the decisions (compared to participants in the 
hardest-to-easiest condition). 
 Further, I test for the possibility that the adopted decision strategy could 
carryover to a procedurally different search task. To do this, I include a “bonus” task 
after the initial sequence manipulation that is the same for all participants. While this 
task also involves search, it is a different manner of search than in the previous tasks. If 
decision strategies are sufficiently sticky, I expect to observe an effect of the sequence 
manipulation (and thus, presumably, of the persistent decision strategy) on search 




 Eighty-nine participants, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), 
completed this study. Participants were paid a fixed sum ($0.40) plus the possibility of 
earning up to $1.00 extra depending on their performance in a bonus task. 
 The study was described to participants as a “Cartoon Caption Study.” 
Participants were told they would see three cartoons (each cartoon represented a 
separate task) and were instructed to select a caption for each cartoon from the available 
choice set of captions. Each caption was numbered sequentially and the choice-set size 
was prominently displayed on the button interface (a graphic depiction of the task is 
shown in Figure 1.1). Participants could advance through the choice set of possible 
captions, one at a time, using “Next” and “Previous” buttons. When participants decided 
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on a caption for the cartoon, they would select the caption using a “Choose Caption” 
button. The program then proceeded to the next cartoon. The cartoons used as stimuli 
were borrowed from a major publication known to feature simple, single-pane cartoons. 
For each of the three cartoons, I randomly selected the choice set from a list of 500 
reader-generated captions (retrieved from the publication’s website).  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Search paradigm used in Study 1.1. Y represents the total number of available 
captions in the choice set (i.e., the choice-set size) and X represents the caption that is 
currently being displayed. Clicking “Next” would advance to caption X+1. 
 
 Participants were randomly assigned to either an increasing task difficulty 
condition or a decreasing task difficulty condition. In the increasing difficulty condition, 
participants first encountered a cartoon with a choice set of 50 possible captions, then a 
cartoon with a choice set of 150 possible captions, and finally a cartoon with a choice set 
of 250 possible captions (order of the actual cartoons was randomize). Participants in the 
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decreasing difficulty condition encountered the reverse sequence (i.e., 250 captions, 150 
captions, then 50 captions).  
 After completing the cartoon caption task, all participants were given an 
additional, bonus task. The bonus task was structured so that search persistence would 
be rewarded with a higher bonus payment. Participants were told that they would “draw” 
a random bonus payment (generated from a quasi-normal distribution bounded at $0.01 
and $1.00). If participants were satisfied with their draw, they could accept it. However, 
participants could continue drawing new bonuses as long as they desired — the final 
bonus payment would be the largest overall bonus draw (this value was clearly displayed 
on the screen). I further emphasized that there was no risk in drawing an additional 
bonus. Each new draw could only increase their payment. The only penalty for drawing 
was time: Each draw took five seconds to materialize. 
 Because I hypothesize that a decision with a small choice set (i.e., an easy 
decision) will lead to a more exhaustive search strategy, I predict that participants who 
encounter the choice sets in an increasing order will sample a greater number of options 
than their counterparts who encounter the same-sized choice sets in a decreasing order. 
The bonus task provides a test of this hypothesized effect's boundary conditions: If an 
adopted decision strategy persists to closely related tasks, will it also persist (to some 




 Strategy Adopted in First Task. I first examined whether participants adapted 
their search strategies based on the difficulty of the first task they encountered. Indeed, 
participants who first encountered a comparatively easy task searched a higher percent 
of the available options for the first task (M = 65%) than those who encountered a 
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comparatively difficult task (M = 16%; t(87) = 7.60, p < .001). Forty-seven percent of 
participants who started with an easy task searched the entire choice set compared to 
only 6% of those who started with a difficult task (logistic regression: z = 3.93, p < .001). 
Thus it appears participants indeed adopted a different search strategy based on the 
difficulty of the decision (operationalized by choice-set size): Participants who started 
with an easier task adopted a more diligent search strategy than those who started with a 
harder task. This research replicates previous findings (Diehl 2005; Meyer 1997). 
 
 Strategy Persistence in Subsequent Tasks. More interesting, I next examined 
whether the search strategy adopted in the first task would persist to the following tasks. 
To do this, I looked at aggregate search across all three tasks. Participants who started 
with the easiest task and proceeded to more difficult tasks sampled more total options 
(M = 154) compared to those who started with a difficult task and proceeded to easier 
tasks (M = 88; t(87) = 2.70, p = .008). Because the three decision tasks were the same 
for all participants, the difference in search should be attributed to decision order. 
Participants who started with an easy decision adopted a more diligent search strategy 
and this strategy persisted to the later decisions. A particularly interesting comparison is 
the second task (i.e., the cartoon with the 150-item choice set). Participants who had just 
completed an easier task and thus had adopted more of a maximizing search strategy 
sampled more options (M = 47) than those who had just completed a harder task and 
had adopted more of a satisficing strategy (M = 26; t(87) = 2.35, p = .02). These results 
suggest that decisions strategies are indeed sticky — participants continued to apply a 
search strategy used in the first task to later tasks in the sequence. Results by condition 
are illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 1.2. Search persistence by condition in Study 1.1. Error bars show standard errors. 
 
 Strategy Persistence to Bonus Task. As a first test of the frog-in-boiling-water 
boundary conditions, I examined whether the search strategy adopted in the cartoon task 
would carry over to the mostly unrelated bonus task. Search persistence at the bonus 
task should be reflected by participants' willingness to incur a higher cost (in time) for 
additional bonus draws (5 seconds per draw). Because draws carry no risk of lower 
bonus payments, a participant with a more diligent search strategy should continue 
drawing longer than one who has previous adopted a less diligent strategy, who should 
be more likely to settle for an earlier draw. Supporting the notion that decision strategies 
can persist even when the task context changes rather drastically, participants in the 
easiest-to-hardest condition requested more draws (M = 52.3) than their counterparts in 
the hardest-to-easiest condition (M = 27.8; t(87) = 1.97, p = .05). In other words, 
participants who adopted a more diligent search strategy based on the relative ease of 
	   15	  
the first cartoon task, not only searched more as the cartoon tasks became more difficult, 
but also searched more in the mostly unrelated, incentive-compatible bonus task which 




 The results of Study 1.1 provide evidence that decision strategies are indeed sticky 
in sequential choice contexts. Much like the frog that does not realize the water 
temperature is changing, a consumer who has adapted her decision strategy to the first 
task in a sequence fails to fully update this strategy as the task difficulty changes in 
subsequent tasks. This failure to update strategies manifests in changes in aggregate 
behavior across the entire sequence of tasks. Further, the effect of a previously adopted 
decision strategy persists even when the task context changes substantively. Perhaps 
then, the notion of gradual change is less important that the frog-in-boiling-water 
metaphor suggests. In the following study, I test more directly whether abrupt changes 
in the task attenuate the persistence of consumer decision strategies. 
 
 
Study 1.2: Abrupt Change in Task Characteristic Promotes Strategy Reconsideration 
 
In this study, I again give participants a series of decisions that require search. Instead of 
manipulating decision order — as I did in Study 1.1 — I manipulate the rate at which the 
difficulty of the decisions changes. All participants start with the same easy decision 
(which should prompt the adoption of a diligent search strategy) and finish with the 
same difficult decision. But, for the middle decisions, I manipulate whether the degree of 
difficulty changes gradually or, alternatively, whether it increases all at once. Returning 
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to the frog-in-boiling-water metaphor, abrupt changes (increasing the water temperature 
quickly) should increase the likelihood that the previously adopted strategy is 
reconsidered. Thus, abrupt changes should attenuate the degree to which the original 




 Seventy-three participants, recruited from the Columbia Business School 
Behavioral Lab subject pool, completed this experiment in exchange for $6.00. 
Participants were told that, as part of a marketing study, they were being asked to create 
a compact disk (CD) with four tracks (songs) using a computer-based customization 
interface. The interface is shown in Figure 1.3. In order to make participants’ choices 
consequential, I informed them that after the study they would be able to download the 
CD that they configured. The options for each track were randomly selected from a pool 
of 2327 (presumably) unfamiliar songs. 
 
Figure 1.3. Song selection interface used in Study 1.2. 
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 Participants proceeded through a series of four song-selection screens, each 
corresponding to a track on the participant’s CD. On each screen, they were presented 
with a list of songs (displayed by name) and asked to choose one for their CD. 
Participants could listen to a song by clicking on its name. The program was self-paced 
and participants could sample as many songs as they wished. They were also free to 
interrupt a song or listen to it again. Once participants chose a song for a given track, 
they continued to the next track and could not go back to change their decision.  
The number of options for each track varied depending on the experimental condition. 
 The experimental design featured three conditions: one in which the difficulty of 
each choice increased gradually and two in which the difficulty increased abruptly. In the 
gradually increasing condition, participants first selected a song from a choice set of five, 
then proceeded to select their second song from a choice set of 10, then their third song 
from a choice set of 15, and then their fourth song from a choice set of 20. In the 
“matched” abrupt increase condition, participants once again first selected a song from a 
choice set of five and then proceeded to select their second song from a different choice 
set of 5. Following their second song selection, the abrupt jump occurred. Participants in 
the “matched” abrupt condition selected their third song from a choice set of 20 and 
their fourth song from a different choice set of 20. It is important to note that in both the 
gradually increasing condition and the “matched” abrupt condition, participants had the 
option to search 50 total songs (choice set sizes by condition: 5-10-15-20 vs. 5-5-20-20). 
Thus a fair comparison can be made across the two conditions regarding the total 
number of songs searched in aggregate across all four decisions. 
 Some participants were also assigned to a second abrupt increase condition in 
which the jump in difficulty occurred after the third song selection. These participants 
chose their first three songs from different choice sets of five and their last song from a 
choice set of 20. This condition was conducted to examine the role of cognitive depletion 
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in this sequential decision paradigm (Baumeister et al. 1998; Levav et al. 2010). When 
selecting their fourth song, participants in this condition should be less “depleted” than 
those in the other two conditions as they have had only easy choices up to that point. 
Cognitive depletion would thus suggest that these participants should search more in the 
final choice set, as they should have the most remaining resources. Importantly, all 
participants search through a choice set of 20 for their final selection, so comparisons 




 Search in First Choice Set. Participants in every condition started with an easy 
choice: selecting one song from a choice set of five. Thus, all participants were equally 
likely to adopt a diligent search strategy for the fist decision. Indeed, there were no 
differences in the number of songs sampled in the first choice set between conditions 
(F(2, 70) = .04, p = .96). Participants across all conditions adopted a diligent strategy, 
sampling an average of 4.66 of the 5 songs. Further, 75% of participants sampled all five 
songs.  
 
 Total Search. I next compared total search between the gradually increasing 
difficulty condition and the “matched” abrupt increase in difficulty condition. 
Participants in both conditions had the ability to sample 50 total songs across all choices. 
If people are more likely to update their decision strategies in the face of a bigger change 
in the choice environment (i.e., the jump in decision difficulty), I should observe less 
total search in the abrupt increase condition compared to the gradually increasing 
condition. Indeed, this is what I find. Participants in the gradually increasing difficulty 
condition sampled an average of 37.5 songs (out of 50), while participants in the abrupt 
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increase in difficulty condition sampled only 29.6 songs (t(46) = 2.04, p = .047). Thus it 
appears participants in the abrupt increase condition were more likely to abandon their 
diligent search strategy in favor of a more judicious search strategy following the more 
salient change in decision difficulty. 
 
 Search in Final Choice Set. As a final analysis, I examined the extent of search in 
the final decision, for which all participants selected a song from a choice set of 20. 
Participants in the gradually increasing condition sampled marginally more songs (M = 
13.1) than participants the in the two abrupt increase conditions (M = 10.9; t(71) = 1.27, p 
= .21). This again suggests that the diligent strategy participants adopted in the first 
choice set was more likely to persist when changes in the decision environment were 
more gradual. 
 After the planned experimental analyses, I conducted additional exploratory 
analyses designed to determine which consumers were most likely to be affected by the 
abrupt (vs. gradual) change in the decision environment. In other words, I wanted to see 
if there were any differences between the consumers who maintained their diligence 
after the abrupt increase and those who switched to a less diligent strategy. To this end, I 
found a variable that predicted strategy persistence in the later decisions: the amount of 
time they spent on the first decision. 
 Because all participants started with a five song choice set, the time they spent on 
the first decision should be unaffected by the experimental manipulation. All 
participants searched thoroughly in this first choice set (in terms of number of songs), 
but some participants spent longer doing so than others. I ran a regression using the 
time participants spent on the first decision (logged for better normality), experimental 
condition (gradual vs. abrupt), and their interaction to predict the number of songs 
searched in the fourth decision. The regression yielded a significant interaction (t(69) = 
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2.32, p = .02): Participants who spent the longest on the first decision were unaffected by 
the manipulation (at +1 SD on time spent: t(69) = .22, p = .83), while those who spent 
less time searching in the first decision were strongly affected by the abrupt increase in 
decision difficulty (at -1 SD on time spent: t(69) = 3.12, p = .003). This interaction is 
illustrated in Figure 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.4. Participants who searched the longest in the first task (in terms of time) were 
unaffected by an abrupt change in the task environment. In contrast, participants who 
searched less in the first task (in terms of time) were more likely to switch to an even less 
diligent strategy after an abrupt change in task environment (compared to gradual 
changes). Error bars show standard errors. 
 
 One possible interpretation of this (post hoc) result is that certain participants 
are more predisposed to adopting a diligent strategy than others and, in this experiment, 
this predisposition is reflected by the amount of time they spent searching for their first 
song. For participants most predisposed to diligence (those who spent the most time on 
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the first decision), abrupt changes in the task environment do not cause strategy change 
— perhaps because they do not wish to change their strategy. However, for participants 
less predisposed to adopting a diligent strategy (those who spent the least time on the 
first decision), abrupt changes in the task environment prompt strategy reconsideration 
and change. 
 
 Cognitive Depletion?. A possible interpretation of the decrease in total search in 
the “matched” abrupt increase condition is that participants were simply “depleted” after 
searching through a choice set of 20 options in their third decision and thus were unable 
to muster the energy to search extensively through the final choice set. To test for this 
possibility, I examined differences in search between the “matched” abrupt increase 
condition (choice set sizes: 5-5-20-20) and the abrupt increase condition in which the 
jump in difficulty occurred after the third choice set (choice set sizes: 5-5-5-20). 
Participants in the condition with the abrupt increase after the second choice set 
sampled marginally fewer songs (M = 9.3) than those in the condition with the abrupt 
increase after the third choice set (M = 12.4; t(47) = 1.46, p = .15), suggesting that 
cognitive fatigue might influence persistence to a degree. However, participants who 
experienced the abrupt increase after the third choice set — and thus should be the least 
“depleted” — did not search more in the fourth choice set compared to those in the 
gradually increasing condition (M = 13.1; t(47) = .38, p = .71), suggesting that cognitive 
fatigue alone cannot explain the results. If cognitive fatigue was the primary cause of 
differences between the conditions, those who were the least “depleted” should have 
persisted the longest at search, a result I do not find.  
 It should also be noted that the results from Study 1.1 are difficult to explain in 
terms cognitive depletion. Participants in the easy-to-hard condition searched more 
options during the primary tasks (which should be “depleting”) then continued to search 
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more options in the bonus task. The role of cognitive fatigue in sequential decisions has 
been explored in other papers (e.g., Levav et al. 2010) and future research should 




Study 1.3: Very Short Interruptions Promote Strategy Reconsideration 
 
In this study, I examine another possible mechanism by which participants may 
recognize the need to update their decision strategy. In this study, I conduct a simple 
manipulation: Half the participants in the study proceed directly from task to task as in 
previous studies. For the other half, I implement a 7-second break between each task. My 
prediction is that by briefly interrupting participants after a task, they will be more likely 
to reconsider their previous decision strategy when engaging in the following task. In 
other words, I expect that previously adopted decision strategies will be less likely to 
persist after a very short break. 
 A second feature of this study is that I move away from the selection decision 
paradigms used in the previous two studies. Instead, I use a search task in which 
decision difficulty is manipulated by the amount of information a participant must 
acquire to make the decision with certainty. I use a paradigm adopted from Johannes 
Abeler and colleagues (2011) in which participants are asked to count the number of 
zeros in a grid. I award participant a bonus payment for correctly determining the 
number of zeros in the grid.  
 In this paradigm, the participant is faced with one of two options: (1) She can 
diligently search the grid and enumerate all of the zeros. Following this diligent strategy 
will typically yield the correct response and the corresponding bonus payment. (2) She 
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can scan the grid quickly and estimate the number of zeros. Following this less diligent 
“guessing” strategy will yield the correct response less frequently and is thus less likely to 
beget a bonus payment. Yet, it is much faster and less effortful. Because participants 
have opportunity costs (they are AMT workers who have access to other profitable tasks), 
the appropriate strategy to adopt should be a function of both the difficulty of the task 
(i.e., how long diligent search will take) and the magnitude of the bonus payment (i.e., 
how profitable diligent search will be). 
 As the core manipulation in this experiment, I order the tasks by decision 
difficulty. Half of the participants encounter easy tasks first (only a few zeros to count) 
followed by more difficult tasks (many zeros to count). In this order, the cost of a diligent 
strategy increases with each choice set. The other half of the participants encounters the 
difficult tasks first followed by the easier tasks. In this order, the cost of a diligent 
strategy decreases with each choice set. 
 For participants who are paid a fixed sum for each correct answer, decision order 
will influence the attractiveness of the first task encountered. Participants in the easy-to-
difficult condition will start with a task in which diligent search is an attractive option. 
However, participants in the difficult-to-easy condition will start with a task in which 
guessing is a more attractive option (as diligent search would take more time and effort 
than the associated bonus payment warrants). Thus the ordering manipulation should 
influence the strategy participants initially adopt (diligent search vs. guessing). If these 
strategies are “sticky,” I should be able to observe a difference in performance across the 
entire sequence of tasks. 
 A final aspect of this study is that I manipulate the pay rate for correct answers. 
For half the participants, I pay a fixed amount per correct answer. Participants in this 
condition should find the easiest tasks a relatively good deal and thus should be 
motivated to employ a diligent search strategy. However, participants in this condition 
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should find the hard tasks a bad deal and should thus be motivated to employ a guessing 
strategy. For the other half of participants, I pay a variable amount per correct answer 
based on the task's difficulty. I calibrated this amount so that all tasks (easy and hard) 
would be moderately attractive. Thus, there should be no change in motivation to employ 
a diligent (vs. guessing strategy) based on task difficulty. 
 In sum, I manipulate task order (easy-to-difficult vs. difficult-to-easy), the 
presence of interruptions (yes vs. no), and the pay rate (fixed vs. variable). I expect the 
frog-in-boiling-water effect to emerge when pay rate is fixed and there are no 
interruptions. I predict that interruptions — which will force participants to briefly 
disengage with the task sequence — will attenuate the frog-in-boiling-water effect. 
Finally, I predict no differences in the variable pay rate condition — as neither order nor 
increased contemplation should influence the relative attractiveness of one strategy 




 Three hundred and twenty-three participants (recruited through AMT) 
completed this experiment as part of a larger block of paid studies. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one condition in a 2 (difficulty: increasing vs. decreasing) x 2 
(interruptions: yes vs. no) x 2 (pay rate: fixed vs. variable) between-subject design. 
Participants were told that they would be presented with seven search tasks and that 
each task would consist of finding and counting the number of zeros in a grid (Abeler et 
al. 2011). Participants were told that for each of the seven tasks, if they successfully 
counted — or, critically, guessed — the number of zeros, they would receive a bonus 
payment, the amount of which would be prominently displayed on the screen above the 
grid. An example stimulus is shown in Figure 1.5. The grids were designed such that they 
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varied in difficulty. The easiest task featured only 17 zeros (out of 150) while the hardest 
featured 69 zeros. 
 
 
Figure 1.5. Sample stimulus for zero counting task (Study 1.3). 
 
 As mentioned previously, participants were explicitly told they could attempt to 
guess the correct number of zeros instead of expending search effort attempting to 
diligently enumerate them all. The difficulty of the tasks was calibrated so that diligent 
search for the correct answer would take approximately 30 seconds for the easiest puzzle 
and approximately 60 seconds in the hardest puzzle (actual median response times for 
successful answers were 28.5 seconds and 56.9 seconds, respectively). The participants 
in my experimental population expect, approximately, to earn 10 cents per minutes 
(respondents to this survey indicated a median desired pay rate of 12.5 cents/minutes). 
Thus in the fixed pay rate condition, searching diligently through the easiest grid was a 
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relatively good deal (about 10 cents/minute), while searching through the most difficult 
grid was a relatively bad deal (about 5 cents/minute). A participant first encountering 
the easiest task in the fixed pay rate condition should be inclined to search the grid 
diligently, while a participant first encountering the most difficult task in the fixed pay 
rate condition should be inclined to perform a cursory search and field a guess, as the 
time cost for diligent search outweighs the expected benefit. 
 The frog-in-boiling-water hypothesis predicts (in the fixed pay rate condition) 
that participants in the easy-to-difficult condition will continue to apply a diligent 
strategy against their best interests as they encounter increasingly difficult, and time 
consuming, search tasks. Conversely, participants in the difficult-to-easy condition 
should experience the opposite issue: They will continue with a guessing strategy even as 
the benefits of switching to a diligent strategy begin to outweigh the costs. In sum, 
participants in the increasing difficulty condition are predicted to search too much 
(compared to their stated pay rates) as they continue to apply an exhaustive strategy long 
after it suits their interests, while participants in the decreasing difficulty condition are 
predicted to search too little as they continue to guess for tasks in which exhaustive 
search would be profitable. The interruptions are predicted to attenuate the differences 
between conditions — as interrupted participants are predicted to be more likely to adapt 
their strategies to the changing conditions.  
 The difficulty-adjusted pay rate condition was included as a control factor. The 
variable pay rate in this condition was calibrated so that each of the search tasks would 
be roughly equal in terms of their cost-benefit calculation (about 7.5 cents/minute). Thus 
participants in both the easy-to-difficult and the difficult-to-easy conditions should 
encounter a first puzzle with a reward inline with the cost associated with exhaustive 
search. Participants in these conditions have little incentive to change strategies, as the 
payment waxes (or wanes) in accordance with the effort required. In a sense, these 
	   27	  
participants are frogs in comfortably warm and unchanging water. No differences are 





 In analyzing the data, an assumption is made and should be explicit: I treat 
correct answers as evidence the participant is using a diligent enumeration strategy and 
incorrect answers as evidence the participant is guessing. Although this might not always 
be true (i.e., one could diligently count and happen to be wrong or could guess and 
happen to be correct), violations of this assumption should not interact with the 
experimental manipulations. Thus, the pattern of results I observe should not be 
invalidated by this assumption. Rather, the assumption should simply produce 
measurement noise within each condition. 
  To analyze the data, I look at the aggregate number of correct answers, which — I 
argue — is a noisy measure of the search strategy participants are using across all of the 
tasks. If a participant gets more correct answers, I take it as evidence she was using a 
diligent enumeration strategy on a greater number of the individual tasks. The number 
of correct answers by condition is shown in Figure 1.6. 
 I conducted a linear regression with the total number of correct answers as the 
dependent variable and the three manipulations — task order, presence of interruptions, 
and pay rate — and their interactions as the independent variances. The regression 
yielded a significant three-way interaction (t(295) = 2.13, p = .034). To explore this 
interaction, I followed the procedures outlined by Stephen Spiller and colleagues (2013). 
 First, I examined the simple interaction between task order and the interruption 
manipulation when correct answers paid the same amount (5 cents) regardless of task 
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difficulty. As predicted, this simple interaction was significant (t(295) = 2.70, p = .007), 
so I further explored the simple simple effects. 
 
Figure 1.6. Aggregate performance by condition in Study 1.3. Correct answers suggest 
that participants are using a diligent search strategy, while incorrect answers suggest 
participants are using a guessing strategy. Error bars show standard errors. 
 
 Replicating the frog-in-boiling-water result from the previous two studies, 
participants (in the fixed pay condition) who were not interrupted and encountered the 
tasks in an easy-to-difficult order provided more correct answers (M = 5.56) than those 
that encountered the tasks in a difficult-to-easy order (M = 4.33; t(295) = 2.43, p = .016). 
These participants started with an easy task in which searching diligently was a relatively 
good deal. They presumably adopted a diligent strategy that then persisted as they 
encountered tasks where exhaustive enumeration was no longer cost-effective. In 
contrast, the participants who started with a hard task presumably adopted a guessing 
strategy, as the cost of diligent search would not have been worth the expected benefit. 
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This strategy also seems to have persisted — the participants in this condition appear to 
have been slow to abandon their guessing strategy as the alternative diligent strategy 
became increasingly profitable. 
 In the condition where participants were interrupted (and were paid a fixed 
amount per correct answer), the simple simple effect of task order was not significant 
(t(295) = 1.37, p = .17). In other words, the performance of participants in the easy-to-
difficult condition was similar to that of participants in the difficult-to-easy condition. 
This is evidence that the interruptions attenuated the persistence of decision strategy 
from task to task. By simply forcing participants to take a brief break between tasks, they 
became better at adapting their strategy to the new task at hand. 
 Finally, I looked at the simple interaction between task order and the 
interruption manipulation when correct answers paid a variable amount based on their 
difficulty (2 cents for the easiest, 8 cents for the hardest). Neither this simple interaction 
(t(295) = .29, p = .77) nor the simple main effects of task order and the interruption 
manipulation (both |t(295)|s < .22, ps > .82) were significant. Thus, all participants in 
the variable pay rate condition performed approximately the same. This was expected, as 
the pay rate was calibrated to be a decent deal for each task. In other words, the cost-
benefit calculation was about the same regardless of the task. Participants who started 
with an easy task or a hard task had approximately equivalent incentives to search 
diligently. And because the cost-benefit calculation was not changing as the tasks 
progressed, even a participant who reconsidered her strategy would likely choose to not 
change it. 
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Discussion 
 
 In this study, I replicated the frog-in-boiling-water effect found in the previous 
studies in a new decision task. Participants seem to have adopted a strategy based on the 
cost-benefit calculation of the first task that then persisted to subsequent tasks. Also, I 
identify a second boundary condition for strategy persistence: brief interruptions. 
Forcing participants to take a short break between tasks eliminated the effect of task 
order (increasing difficulty vs. decreasing difficulty). Relating this back to the frog 
metaphor, if you force the frog to briefly exit the water, it will be more likely to notice the 





The present investigation contributes to a growing literature at the intersection of 
consumer search and choice (e.g., Häubl, Dellaert, and Donkers 2010; Kim, 
Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg 2010). In Study 1.1, I provide evidence for the basic frog-
in-boiling-water effect: People search more in aggregate when decisions are ordered 
from easy to difficult. Additionally, following the sequence of either increasingly or 
decreasingly difficult search tasks, Study 1.1 featured a final “bonus” search task that was 
the same for all participants. Participants who encountered the easy-to-hard ordering of 
initial tasks persisted longer at this final task than those who encountered the hard-to-
easy ordering, suggesting that adopted decision strategies can persist (to a degree) even 
when the superficial nature of the task changes quite drastically. Study 1.2 replicated the 
frog-in-boiling-water effect, but suggested a boundary condition: Decision strategies are 
less persistent when changes in the task characteristics are greater. In short, abrupt 
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changes in environment can help people abandon a routinized strategy in favor of a more 
appropriate one. Further, Study 1.2 illuminates the type of people who might be most 
prone to the frog-in-boiling-water phenomenon: those who are least ardent adopters of 
the initial strategy. Finally, Study 1.3 introduces an intervention that reduces the frog-in-
boiling-water effect: a short break between tasks. People who are forced to take a 
moment to stop (and presumably reflect), reengage with the next task in a manner more 




 The present findings raise several theoretical and practical implications. First, 
past research using one-shot decisions offers compelling evidence that consumers adapt 
their decision strategies according to the requirements of the choice task (Bettman, Luce, 
and Payne 1998; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). Here I argue that people are 
actually “sticky adapters” whose strategies are adapted to new contexts — such as the 
initial decision difficulty — but persist to a significant degree even in the face of changes 
in the decision environment. Second, the present findings indicate that the effect of 
decision difficulty on motivation may be contingent on consumers’ previous experience. 
In particular, past research suggested that consumers faced with a difficulty decision 
(e.g., large number of options in a choice set) will be less motivated to make a purchase 
(Iyengar and Lepper 2000). Yet, participants in my experiments who were initially 
exposed to easy decision (e.g., those with small choice sets) and then were exposed to 
more difficult decisions (e.g., those with large choice sets) appeared to “keep up” and 
remained more motivated as indicated by their more extensive search relative to those 
who saw the reverse sequence. 
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On Mindsets and Einstellung 
 
 A possible explanation for the persistence of a decision strategy comes from work 
on consumer mindsets. Mindsets have been defined broadly in consumer research: They 
can refer to the cognitive or motor procedures (Wyer and Xu 2010), judgmental criteria 
(Xu and Wyer 2007), or goals (Keinan and Kivetz 2011) that are triggered by a task and 
subsequently generalized to different tasks or contexts. For instance, research suggests 
that considering a purchase in category x increases the probability of purchase in a 
subsequent, unrelated category y because the act of consideration places consumers in a 
“which-to-buy” mindset (Xu and Wyer 2007). Similarly, it has been suggested that an 
initial task that utilizes broader rather than narrower categories can lead people to create 
broader rather than finer grouping of items in a subsequent, unrelated task (Ülkümen, 
Chakravarti, and Morwitz 2010). 
 In this chapter, I show the effect of persistent decision strategies in sequential 
decisions that require search. Further, I attempt to address the question of when these 
adopted strategies (and possibly goals) persist. Study 1.1 suggests that the influence of a 
decision strategy (or mindset) can linger to a mostly unrelated task. However, Studies 1.2 
and 1.3 show attenuating factors: Abrupt changes and brief interruptions can limit the 
carryover effects. When tasks seem more different (abrupt vs. gradual changes) or when 
forced to take a brief moment to disengage after a task (interruptions vs. no 
interruptions), people seem better able to adapt to the appropriate demands of the new 
task.  
 To the extent the present work can be characterized as studying consumer 
mindsets, it would suggest that: (1) Mindsets are more likely to persist when sequential 
tasks are more similar and (2) Mindsets are less likely to persist sequential tasks are 
further separated in time. Future research should more clearly delineate the boundary 
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conditions of mindsets. A parallel can be drawn to research on non-conscious goals and 
automaticity (e.g., Bargh and Chartrand 1999). While these are both certainly influential 
factors in consumer behavior, effort should be made to explicate specifically when you 




 Sequential decisions are ubiquitous in the marketplace. Firms frequently impose 
order to these decisions through interfaces (e.g., customization engines) that reflect an 
engineer's perspective about how the decisions should be sequenced. Typically decisions 
are ordered such that the more central components are determined before the more 
peripheral ones. This research shows that more attention should be placed on 
understanding the psychological factors relevant to decision order. Firms may have the 
opportunity to influence the behavior of their customers in a desirable manner simply by 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Variance Neglect in Consumer Search 
 
Consumers often know exactly what they want, but are not sure how much they will have 
to pay to get it. In these situations, the consumer must search to find an acceptable price 
(if there is one) for the product or service they are seeking. Even when the product is 
homogenous (i.e., the same regardless of where it is purchased), the price of the product 
can vary substantially between retailers (e.g., Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2004). By 
visiting more retailers (“visiting” is used here loosely, it can simply mean viewing the 
product on a retailer's website or, perhaps, requesting a price quote), the consumer can 
expect to find a better price. However, there are diminishing returns to search. The more 
retailers a consumer has visited, the less likely the next retailer she visits will have a 
better price than one she's already seen. There is also a cost to extending search. At the 
very least this cost is the consumer's time (which entails opportunity costs), but it can 
also be monetary if, for example, searching requires travel. 
 In the current investigation, I examine how the prices a consumer has previously 
seen during search influence her perception of the likely distribution of prices in the 
market and consequently her decision on whether or not to continue searching. 
Specifically, I look at the variance of previously observed prices and the information it 
can convey about the benefits of continued search. If prices are encountered randomly 
(i.e., if a consumer is not predisposed to visit specific retailers), previously seen prices 
can be used to infer the distribution of all possible prices in the marketplace. This 
inference is important: The variance of prices in the marketplace determines the 
economic value of continued search. If people can accurately infer price variance from 
previously seen prices, they are able to better optimize the effort they expend searching 
for a better price. 
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 Following this logic, consumers searching for the best price should attend to the 
absolute (i.e., in dollars, not percent) differences in the prices they have previously seen. 
If previously seen prices are very similar to one another (low variance), it can be inferred 
that future (unseen) prices are also similar. When prices are more similar (i.e., closer in 
absolute magnitude), the benefit of continued search is lower. The extreme case is when 
the prices are identical. If there is no variation in price across retailers, there is no value 
in search. If a consumer can accurately infer a state of low price variance, she can save 
effort (and perhaps money) by terminating search. 
 In the alternative case, if previously observed prices are very dispersed (i.e., 
further apart in absolute magnitude, high variance), it can be inferred that future 
(unseen) prices are also very dispersed. In this case, the benefits of search are much 
greater. If a consumer can accurately infer a state of high price variance, she can exert 
increased search effort and expect to yield high savings with the best price she eventually 
finds. 
 This line of reasoning has been explicated in theoretical models of search 
(Rothschild 1974; Stigler 1961). This research argues and demonstrates that price 
dispersion — the variation in price across retailers — should be a primary driver of 
search persistence. Importantly, this economic research suggests that the absolute (i.e., 
dollar savings), rather than relative (i.e., percent savings), magnitude of price dispersion 
is what should matter. If two products have the same price dispersion across retailers but 
different average prices (e.g., one is expensive and one is cheap), the incentive for 
additional search is the same for both products. The intuition behind this will be 
explained more thoroughly in a subsequent section. 
 In contrast to the implications of economic models of search, I find the exact 
opposite pattern of behavior: Consumers tend to search less when price dispersion is 
high and tend to search more when price dispersion is low. Further, I find that the 
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magnitude of prices (i.e., whether the product has a high price or a low price) has a 
strong impact on search persistence. This result is also inconsistent with normative 
search models, which suggest that the magnitude of price should be irrelevant to search 
persistence. I propose an explanation for both of these counter-normative effects: 
Consumers have ecologically rational a priori beliefs about the relationship between 
price magnitude and price dispersion. These beliefs serve as an adaptive function when 
the environment matches expectations, but can lead to negative consequences — accrual 




Normative Models of Persistence in Price Search 
 
Economists have been studying the problem of price search for over 50 years. In its most 
basic form, price search involves a single consumer searching through a number of 
prices available for a single product. The consumer must purchase at one (and only one) 
price and her goal is to minimize total cost. Cost in consumer price search has two 
components. First, there is the actual price of the good for which price quotes are being 
sought. Cheaper is obviously better. Second, there is the cost of conducting search. The 
balancing act in consumer price search is to find a good enough price without incurring 
too much search cost. Without search costs, the optimal solution would be to search 
every possible price. With search costs, the optimal solution becomes more complicated. 
The crux of the issue is what is often called optimal stopping: The goal is to stop when 
the expected marginal benefit of continued search (finding an even lower price) becomes 
less than the marginal cost of continued search. 
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 George Stigler (1961) was one of the first to apply economic rigor to the problem 
of price search (and the analogous problem of wage search; Stigler 1962). If the 
distribution of possible prices is known by the consumer in advance, Stigler showed that 
her expected search at the outset should be a fixed number of retailers determined by the 
dispersion of prices and the consumer’s search costs. On average, the consumer should 
search N stores: The expected benefit of searching one more store after the N-1th would 
yield (on average) a big enough expected price discount to more than offset the search 
cost. However, going from the Nth store to the N+1th store would not yield a sufficient 
expected price discount to warrant the search cost incurred. 
 Stigler’s approach is reasonable in many cases (e.g., if it takes a long time to 
receive a requested price quote) and yields “well-behaved” consumer demand functions, 
however it ignores the sequential aspects of each individual consumer’s search progress. 
While a consumer could, at the outset, decide to search exactly N stores based on the 
expected costs and benefits, she would not always stop her search at the appropriate 
time. Sometimes she would under-persist and other times she would over-persist. I 
present a hypothetical example in the next paragraph to illustrate this fact. 
 Imagine a consumer knows that a given product is offered at exactly two prices — 
$10 and $30 — with the exact same probability (i.e., half the stores carry the product for 
$10 and half carry the product for $30). Further imagine the consumer must spend $4 to 
visit each store for the first time. If she searches one store, her search cost will be $4 and 
her expected price will be $20 (50% chance of $10 and 50% chance of $30) — a total 
expected cost of $24. If she searches 2 stores, her search cost will be $8 (2 × $4) and her 
expected price will be $15 dollars (75% chance of $10 and 25% chance of $30) — a total 
expected cost of $23. If she searches 3 stores, her search cost will be $12 (3 × $4) and her 
expected price will be $12.50 (87.5% chance of $10 and 12.5% chance of $30) — a total 
expected cost of $24.50. The best fixed-depth strategy, then, would be to search two 
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stores — it has the lowest expected total cost ($23) compared to searching one store 
($24) or searching three or more ($24.50+). 
 However, if the consumer goes to the first store and finds the price of the product 
to be $10 (which will happen half the time), it makes no sense to continue searching and 
visit the second store. In this case, following the fixed depth strategy would lead to over-
persistence. Likewise, if the consumer visited two stores and happened to find the 
product selling for $30 at each (a 25% likely occurrence), it would be foolish not to 
continue searching — her expected gain of searching another store would be $10 (the 
expected price at the next store is $20 — a 50% chance of $10 and a 50% chance of $30) 
and the cost would only be $4 to visit the next store. In this case following the fixed 
depth strategy would lead to under-persistence. 
 Clearly, the sequential dynamics of search are important even when the 
distribution is known — the prices one happens to encounter at the beginning of search 
influence the cost-benefit calculation of continued search. Subsequent researchers (e.g., 
McCall 1970) showed that for known distributions, a price threshold rule yields optimal 
results. In other words, a consumer — knowing the expected distribution of prices — can 
set an acceptable price threshold before starting her search. A consumer should then 
persist at search until she encounters a price below the optimal threshold at which point 
she should cease search and accept the below-threshold price. This rule is easy to 
implement in the hypothetical example above: The searcher in this scenario should 
continue searching until she finds a price below $30. Until then, the expected benefit of 
search is always $10 (a 50% chance of saving $20) and the cost is fixed at $4. Fixed 
threshold stopping rules are appealing, not just because they are the optimal solution to 
a search problem with a known price distribution, but also because they would be easy 
for a consumer to implement. Herbert Simon (1955) proposed a threshold rule he called 
“satisficing” as a possible mechanism for boundedly-rational beings to make ecologically 
	   39	  
rational stopping decisions. A satisficing consumer would pick a reservation price and 
accept the first price she encountered below that reservation price. 
 Michael Rothschild (1974) added an additional piece of the theory by showing 
that a threshold rule was also the optimal solution for stopping price search when the 
distribution of prices is unknown to the consumer (who is assumed to have Dirichlet 
prior beliefs). Although the threshold is no longer fixed, Rothschild showed that an 
optimal stopping threshold could be calculated at any state/time with a given history of 
previously seen prices. In other words, at any point of time — even if the consumer does 
not know the exact nature of the price distribution — she should be able to calculate a 
threshold below which any price should be accepted. 
 For the current research, it is important to note that all of the previously 
described stopping rules share a common trait: Given a cost function for search, optimal 
persistence should be determined exclusively by the dispersion of prices. If prices vary 
widely across retailers, consumers should search more. If prices vary only modestly, 
consumers should search less. Critically, what matters is how much the prices vary on 
absolute, not relative, terms. The intuition behind this fact might be best illustrated in an 
example: Imagine a consumer is searching for a new tablet computer. Retailers offer 
different prices for the same tablet computer — some sell it for $500, others for $550, 
and still others for $600. Imagine the same consumer is also searching for a new car. 
Some dealers sell the car for $38,500, others for $38,550, and still others for $38,600. 
Assuming search costs are the same for the two products, a consumer should (according 
to both optimal-threshold and fixed-depth rules) plan to spend equal time searching for 
both product categories. Even though paying $500 versus $600 for a tablet feels like 
saving more money than paying $38,500 versus $38,600 for a new car (e.g., Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981), objectively the value of search is the same in both cases. The mean 
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price of the distribution should not matter (e.g., $550 vs. $38,550) — only the variance 
in prices across retailers. 
 
 
The Present Investigation 
 
In this chapter, I examine the extent to which consumers do, or do not, follow economic 
prescriptions when conducting price search. I use a simplified experimental paradigm in 
which participants are asked to find a “good” price for a specific product (i.e., there is no 
variation in quality, only price). They can “visit” retailers by incurring a cost 
(operationalized as a 3-second delay) and can stop search at any time by selecting a 
previously seen price (without cost). I measure persistence in search as the number of 
retailers visited before making a purchase. Prices in the studies are drawn randomly 
from a Gaussian distribution. Critically, I examine how the mean of the price distribution 
(i.e., the price magnitude) and standard deviation of the price distribution (i.e., the price 
dispersion) influence participants' persistence in the price search task. 
 In each class of economic model described above — those with fixed depth rules 
(e.g., Stigler 1961), those with fixed threshold rules (e.g., McCall 1970), and those with 
moving threshold rules (e.g., Rothschild 1974) — consumers should search more when 
the variance of the price distribution is greater (i.e., more dispersed prices). Further, the 
models uniformly agree that the mean of the price distribution (i.e., the average 
magnitude of the price) should not affect persistence in search. By manipulating the 
mean and variance of the price distribution in my experimental price search task, I am 
able to assess the degree to which consumers adhere to these prescriptions. 
 More importantly, if consumers do not adhere to economic prescriptions, it is 
worthwhile to examine what does, in fact, influence persistence in consumer price 
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search. To this end, I explore inferential and representational processes in consumer 
cognition. I look at whether, given a single price observation for a product, consumers 
are able to form a mental representation of the possible price dispersion in the market. 
Further, I look at whether these representations affect the downstream behavior of 
search. If consumers infer greater price dispersion based on higher price magnitude, 
these beliefs could lead consumers to search more for higher priced products. Average 
price (or even a single price) would, in this case, act as a cue that more extensive search 
should be (or should not be) profitable. This inferential heuristic would often be 
appropriate, as higher priced products tend to have greater price dispersion (Pratt, Wise, 
and Zeckhauser 1979). However, some expensive products have low price dispersion and 
some cheap products have high price dispersion. If consumers fail to recognize this 
during price search, they risk accruing unnecessary search costs or missing out on 
opportunities for big savings. 
 
 
Overview of Empirical Evidence 
  
In Study 2.1, I present preliminary evidence of “variance neglect.” Consumers fail to 
increase their search persistence in response to increased price dispersion. In fact, they 
search marginally less when price dispersion is higher — the exact opposite behavior 
prescribed by normative search theories. Further, in Study 2.1, I find consumers search 
marginally more when the average price of the product is higher (holding price 
dispersion constant). Normative models suggest that price magnitude should be an 
inconsequential factor in search. I propose a model that can account for these two 
seemingly counter-normative results based on consumer beliefs about the relationship 
between price magnitude and price dispersion. If consumers believe higher priced 
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products should have more price variance, it would be consistent with these beliefs to 
search more for higher priced products. In Study 2.2, I provide evidence that consumers 
indeed believe higher priced products should have higher price variance. In Study 2.3, I 
show that these beliefs correlate with persistence in search. Those who expect more 
dispersion at a given price persist longer at search than those who expect less dispersion. 
Finally, in Study 2.4, I provide evidence that these beliefs are ecologically rational: When 
the marketplace corresponds to consumer expectations about the relationship between 
price magnitude and price dispersion, consumers behave in a manner consistent with 
normative models. However, when the environment deviates from expectations, 
consumers respond in a maladaptive manner consistent with their prior beliefs: They 
search even more for higher priced products and search even less for the lower priced 
products. This suggests that consumers are slow to update their beliefs even when 
presented with contradictory information.  
 
 
Study 2.1: The Influence of Price Dispersion and Price Magnitude on Search Persistence 
 
In this study, I examine the extent to which consumers — when encountering an 
unknown distribution of prices — adhere to the normative models' prescriptions for price 
search. Namely, I test the extent to which price dispersion influences search persistence. 
Further, I test whether price magnitude (i.e., the average price of the product) influences 
search persistence. Economic models prescribe more search persistence when price 
dispersion is greater (i.e., more variance in prices) and no difference in search 
persistence based on the average price. Results from this study suggest that economic 
models do not accurately characterize people’s price search behavior. Instead, they tend 
to search less when price dispersion is greater and more when average prices are higher. 




 I recruited 300 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) with the 
following requirements: United States IP address, completed more than 50 HITs, and 
95% approval rating or greater (the same requirements are used in subsequent studies). 
Seven participants did not engage in any search and are removed from the analysis. 
Participants were asked to imagine they were buying a new car. The exact same car was 
said to be available at “many” dealerships (the actual number of possible dealerships was 
50). The participant's task was to search through as many dealerships as she wanted with 
the goal of finding a “good deal” on the car. Searching a new dealership entailed a time 
cost of three seconds, but previously seen dealerships could be revisited immediately. 
 Participants searched through dealerships using the interface displayed in Figure 
2.1 (the experiment was programmed using JavaScript). Clicking the “Next” button 
advanced the participant to the subsequent dealer and, after a three second delay (if they 
had not visited the dealer before), showed the new dealer's price for the car. Clicking the 
“Previous” button allowed participants to revisit previously seen dealers and their prices. 
At any time, participants could terminate their search and select the currently displayed 
price by clicking the “Accept this deal” button. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Experiment interface used in Study 2.1. 
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 Critically, I manipulated the parameters of the price distribution between 
participants. Participants were randomly assigned to search prices drawn from one of 
five normal distributions (details presented below). To manipulate price dispersion, the 
standard deviation of the price distributions varied from $500 (low dispersion) to 
$2,500 (high dispersion). To manipulation price magnitude, the mean of the price 
distributions varied from $10,000 (low magnitude) to $30,000 (high magnitude). For a 
participant in the low dispersion (SD = $500), moderate price (M = $20,000) condition, 
the prices she would encounter for the car would be tightly clustered around $20,000 
(e.g., Dealer #1: $19,532, Dealer #2: $20,075, Dealer #3: $19,827, etc.). Conversely, for a 
participant in the high dispersion (SD = $2,500), moderate price (M = $20,000) 
condition, the prices she would encounter would still be centered on $20,000, but would 
be further apart (e.g., Dealer #1: $17,435, Dealer #2: $25,532, Dealer #3: $20,669, etc.). 
Crucially, normative theory prescribes more searching when dispersion is higher: 
Participants in the high-dispersion condition have more to gain by persisting in search 




 In this study (and subsequent studies), I find that search depth — the key 
dependent measure of interest — is not distributed normally (Shapiro-Wilk test: W = .78, 
p < 10-16). Even after log-transforming search depth, the distribution still fails to meet 
the standard criteria of normality (Shapiro-Wilk test: W = .98, p = .0002). I therefore 
avoid using hypothesis tests that require a normality assumption (e.g., t-tests) and 
instead use non-parametric hypothesis tests (augmented by bootstrap simulations) when 
analyzing the results. 
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 As a first analysis, I examined whether price dispersion (operationalized as the 
standard deviation of the price distribution) influenced search persistence holding the 
mean of the price distribution constant at $20,000. I tested three levels of price 
dispersion: low (SD = $500), moderate (SD = $1,500), and high (SD = $2,500). 
Although the economic incentive to continue search is greatest when dispersion is high, 
the participants did not conform to this normative prescription. In fact, participants 
searched moderately more when price dispersion was lowest (median number of 
dealerships visited = 10.5 vs. 8 and 9, Spearman's ρ = -.05, bootstrapped 95% CI [-.19, 
.10]) — the opposite behavior as would be expected from fully rational agents. 
Restricting the same analysis to participants who viewed seven or more prices (66% of 
participants) — and thus those who could more accurate estimate of price dispersion — 
reveals a significant negative relationship between price dispersion and search 
magnitude (Spearman's ρ = -.18, bootstrapped 95% CI [-.34, -.002]). Search depth by 
dispersion condition is shown in Figure 2.2. (Note: The same analyses were conducted 
using the standard deviation of the actual prices observed by the participant and yield 
similar results: Spearman's ρ = -.04 for all participants, Spearman's ρ = -.12 for only 
those who searched seven prices or more.) 
 While economic theory would prescribe increasing search depth (in aggregate) 
with respect to price dispersion, the data do not support this hypothesis. I bootstrapped 
10,000 samples of the experimental conditions and found the economically prescribed 
trend (i.e., median search depth monotonically increasing in price dispersion) in only 
5.2% of the samples. In contrast, I observed the opposite pattern (i.e., median search 
depth monotonically decreasing in price dispersion) in 43% of the samples. Further in 
the same bootstrap analysis, the median search depth for the low dispersion condition 
was greater than the average of the two higher dispersion conditions in 87% of the 
samples. 
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Figure 2.2. Search persistence holding price magnitude constant and varying price 
dispersion. Dots indicate median search depth by experimental condition and gray bars 
approximate the standard error (bootstrapped 68% confidence interval). 
 
 I conducted a second bootstrap analysis to determine the likelihood of the 
observed degree of difference in search depth under the null hypothesis (no differences 
between conditions). Only 3.7% percent of these samples yielded median search in the 
lowest dispersion condition greater (by two or more — the degree difference observed in 
the study) than the two higher dispersion conditions. These results suggest that 
participants, at the very least, are neglecting to account for price dispersion when 
determining whether to persist at search. Further, to the extent participants do account 
for price dispersion, they appear to do so in a manner contrary to what is suggested by 
optimal search models. 
 As a second analysis, I examined whether price magnitude (operationalized as 
the mean of the price distribution) influenced search persistence holding price 
dispersion constant (SD = $1,500). I tested three levels of price magnitude: low (M = 
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$10,000), moderate (M = $20,000), and high (M = $30,000). (Note: the moderate price 
magnitude condition is the same as in the previous analysis.) Economic models of search 
prescribe that price magnitude should be irrelevant to search persistence, as price 
dispersion is the critical factor. However, the data from this study suggest that 
participants tend to search more when price magnitude is highest (median number of 
dealerships visited = 10.5 vs. 8 and 9, Spearman's ρ = .09, bootstrapped 95% CI [-.05, 
.23]). Figure 2.3 shows this result graphically. I conducted another bootstrap analysis to 
determine the likelihood of observing greater median search persistence in the highest 
price magnitude condition (by two or more — the degree difference observed in the 
study) under the null hypothesis (no difference between experimental conditions). Once 
again, this analysis suggested this pattern did not arrive by chance. Only 2.2% of the 
simulations featured a result as strong as observed in the actual data. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Search persistence holding price dispersion constant and varying price 
magnitude. Dots indicate median search depth by experimental condition and gray bars 
approximate the standard error (bootstrapped 68% confidence interval). 
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Discussion 
 
 In Study 2.1, I manipulated price dispersion and price magnitude and observed 
persistence in a simple price search task. Economic models of price search show that 
consumers should search more when price dispersion is high. However, I do not observe 
this behavior. Instead, it seems that the extent to which consumers incorporate price 
dispersion cues into search persistence, they do so in a manner opposite of what is 
suggested by economic models. In this study, consumers search the most when 
dispersion is lowest. A second result from Study 2.1 is that price magnitude, an 
inconsequential factor in economic models of search persistence, seems to produce 
differences is depth of search. Participants in Study 2.1 searched the most when price 
magnitude was high.  
 It appears that consumers are not appropriately sensitive to the primary 
diagnostic cue (i.e., price dispersion) during sequential search. Further, they appear 
sensitive to a cue that should, theoretically, be non-diagnostic (i.e., price magnitude). 
This raises the question: Why do consumers make these “mistakes?” In the remainder of 
this chapter, I propose that these deviations from normative search theory arise because 
consumers make inferences about price dispersion based on observed price magnitude. 
Specifically, I argue that consumers have a priori beliefs about the relationship between 
price magnitude and price dispersion. Given even a single price, I argue consumers will 
infer a level of price dispersion around that price (accounting for other situational 
information). Further, I argue that consumers believe there should be more price 
dispersion for more expensive items. Given these beliefs, variance neglect in search is not 
a misinterpretation of environmental cues, but rather a failure to update prior beliefs 
sufficiently in the presence of new information (i.e., the prices already encountered). In 
the next section, I present evidence that beliefs about the relationship between price 
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magnitude and price dispersion are grounded in empirical reality. Further, because 
expensive items tend to have higher price dispersion, the behaviors I observe in Study 2.1 
could be seen as ecologically rational (Pham 2007; Todd, Gigerenzer, and the ABC 
Research Group 2012).  
 
 
The Empirical Relationship between Price Magnitude and Price Dispersion 
 
Prices for the exact same product routinely vary between retailers (e.g., Isard 1977; 
Varian 1980). The reason for price dispersion has been a topic of much interest. 
Originally, search (or information) costs were implicated as the primary cause of price 
dispersion (e.g., Stigler 1961, but see Diamond 1971 and Rothschild 1973 for critiques of 
Stigler's approach and Burdett and Judd 1983 for a possible reconciliation). The gist of 
this argument is that a consumer who does not visit every retailer (due to costly search) 
will probabilistically pay a higher price than the lowest in the market (i.e., she will fail to 
visit the retailer with the absolute lowest price). Thus a retailer offering a price greater 
than the lowest available can still expect some sales (although it will be fewer than if the 
price was the lower) and will achieve a higher margin on these sales. 
 A challenge faced by search cost models of price dispersion is that the Internet 
has drastically reduced search costs in some markets, yet price dispersion in these 
markets remains relatively high (Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2006; Brynjolfsson and 
Smith 2000). An alternative class of models, often called “clearinghouse” models 
because they assume the consumer has access to a directory of prices offered by different 
retailers, can explain price dispersion in the absence of search costs through consumer 
sophistication (Varian 1980), consumer loyalty (Rosenthal 1980), or costly price 
transmission (i.e., costly advertising, Baye and Morgan 2001). Behaviorally informed 
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models have also been proposed, which can explain the persistence of price dispersion by 
imposing rationality constraints on consumers (e.g., limited computational abilities; 
Baye and Morgan 2004; Johnson et al. 2004). 
 More relevant to the current research: Observed price dispersion tends to be 
higher for more expensive products. For example, a survey of randomly selected 
consumer products in Boston revealed a power law relationship between observed mean 
price and observed standard deviation of price: Doubling the mean price corresponded 
to an 86% increase in standard deviation (Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser 1979). A 
subsequent survey replicated this result, showing a positive relationship between 
observed mean price and observed price range for various models of televisions, 
videocassette recorders, and microwave ovens across different retailers in a different 
U.S. city (Grewal and Marmorstein 1994). In short, the reality of the marketplace is that 
more expensive products tend to have greater absolute differences in price across 
retailers. 
 It is not well understood why more expensive products should have greater price 
dispersion across retailers. It may be simply that means and variances tend to be 
correlated in statistical distributions regardless of their nature (Neyman 1926). An 
economic rationale can be obtained by assuming price dispersion should be a function of 
aggregate consumer search (Stigler 1961). In this case, more expensive products may 
have greater price dispersion because they are purchased less frequently and thus 
represent a smaller portion of the average consumer's expenditures. If cheaper products 
are purchased more frequently, the benefits of extensive search can yield both immediate 
savings and future savings (i.e., better prices for subsequent purchases). Alternatively, 
psychologists have argued that references prices and diminishing marginal utility could 
alter the perceived benefits of search at different prices. This line of argument is related 
to the present investigation and I return to this topic in the general discussion. However, 
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regardless of the cause — if search costs are the same — it remains more profitable to 
search from a high dispersion price distribution than a low dispersion price distribution. 
 Because price magnitude and price dispersion are correlated in the marketplace, 
consumers may — quite reasonably — learn to use price magnitude as a cue of price 
dispersion. Over time, a consumer might learn that searching extensively while shopping 
for a cheaper product typically yields minimal absolute savings. Additionally, she might 
learn that searching extensively while shopping for an expensive product can — 
occasionally, at least — yield significant absolute savings. Given the reality of the 
marketplace, a consumer who determined search persistence — for example, the number 
of stores she would visit — exclusively by the magnitude of the first price encountered, 
would tend to behave in a manner consistent with normative search models. However, 
the empirical relationship between price magnitude and price dispersion is not perfect. A 
consumer who relies solely on price magnitude to determine search persistence will 
often over-search (for high priced products with low dispersion) and under-search (for 




Study 2.2: Consumer Beliefs about the Relationship between Price Magnitude and Price 
Dispersion 
 
Previous research has shown that higher priced items tend to feature larger price 
dispersion, yet it is not clear whether the typical consumer knows this relationship exists. 
Economists in the 1970s were, for example, surprised by the degree of the relationship 
(Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser (1979) called it “puzzlingly high”, p. 205). Further, 
researchers have speculated that dispersion should decrease if consumers are more 
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knowledgeable about the expected price distribution (Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser 1979; 
Sorenson 2000). This suggests the existent empirical relationship would not exist (or at 
least would be substantially weaker) if consumers indeed know that higher priced 
products are priced more disparately. 
 In this study, I attempt to measure consumer beliefs about the relationship 
between price magnitude and price dispersion. I present participants with six durable 
goods and an associated selling price for each ranging from $43 to $77,995. I then ask 
participants to guess the absolute minimum and maximum prices other consumers have 
paid for the exact same product. I find that consumers indeed expect higher price 
dispersion for more expensive products. Further, consumers are remarkably well 





 Three hundred participants, recruited through AMT, completed this survey as 
part of a larger block of studies. Each participant evaluated six durable consumer 
products with a corresponding selling price in random order. For each product, the 
participant was asked to guess the minimum price a consumer had paid for the exact 
same product and the maximum price a consumer had paid for the exact same product. 
These two measures are then combined to form a price range. An example stimulus is 
presented in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4. Sample stimulus from Study 2.2. Other products included a set of speakers 
($409), a washing machine ($1,038), a recreational vehicle ($77,995), a jet ski ($8,499), 




 As shown in Figure 2.5, participants in this study believed more expensive 
products would exhibit greater price dispersion. For each participant, I regressed the 
expressed price range (logged) on the price magnitude (the price given with the product, 
also logged). All 300 participants expressed a positive relationship between given price 
and expected price range (a positive beta coefficient in the regression). Further, 
participants seem well calibrated to the actual dispersion in the retail environment 
shown in previous reports (e.g., Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser 1979). The median 
participant beta (denoting the relationship between price magnitude and price 
dispersion) was .88 (bootstrapped 95% CI [.87, .89]). This is almost identical to .89, 
which was the empirical relationship previously found to exist in the marketplace for 
consumer goods (Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser 1979; Note: although this paper uses the 
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standard deviation of prices as a measure of price dispersion and the current 
investigation uses price range, the beta terms are directly comparable given the 
assumption that price range is linearly related to the standard deviation of prices. In fact, 
if price range is approximated as four-and-a-half times the standard deviation of prices, 
the median intercept from the current investigation perfectly matches the previously 
found estimate of -1.52). 
 
Figure 2.5. The range of prices consumers predicted to exist in the marketplace for six 
durable products at different price magnitudes (in log-log scale). Dots represent the 
median response, heavy black bars represent 50% of the data (the middle two quartiles) 




 Data from this study suggest participants indeed expect higher price dispersion 
for products with higher price magnitude. This belief correlates surprising well with the 
actual dispersion found in the marketplace at different levels of price magnitude. One 
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possible criticism of this study is that participants may not have beliefs about the 
relationship between price magnitude and price dispersion, but may instead have beliefs 
about the price dispersion for the particular products under question. I address this 
criticism in the following study. 
 Because participants expect higher price dispersion around more expensive 
items, it would be consistent with these beliefs for participants to search more 
exhaustively for higher priced items: When dispersion is higher (in an absolute sense), 
the expected marginal benefit of continuing search is greater. Further, when price 
magnitude is held constant, it would again be consistent with these beliefs to search less 
when actual price dispersion is greater. When the actual price dispersion exceeds the 
expected price dispersion (i.e., a consumer's prior belief about price dispersion for a 
given price magnitude), the consumer will likely encounter a price that she perceives to 
be exceptionally good in fewer store visits. I illustrate the rationale behind this point in 
Figure 2.6. 
 The beliefs expressed in Study 2.2 could thereby map on to the results from Study 
2.1: Participants searched more when the price magnitude was greater (and, presumably, 
they believed the price dispersion to be greater) and less (holding price magnitude 
constant) when price dispersion was greater. If beliefs about expected price dispersion 
(based on price magnitude) are influencing search persistence, a possible test is to look 
at individual differences in these beliefs: Participants who expect more price dispersion 
at a given price magnitude should persist longer when searching for a product priced at 
that magnitude. I examine this proposition in the following study. 
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Figure 2.6. Illustration of how beliefs about price dispersion can influence search 
persistence. The gray histograms represent the “actual” distribution of prices available 
(M = $15,000, SD = $1,000). The black curves represent beliefs (less dispersion: M = 
$15,000, SD = $500, more dispersion: M = $15,000, SD = $2,000). When a person who 
believes there is less dispersion encounters the price of $13,500, she thinks it represents 
a good deal (.1% chance of encountering something better on the next visit) and is likely 
to terminate search. However, when a person who believes there is more dispersion 
encounters the price of $13,500, she thinks it represents an average deal (23% chance of 
encountering something better on the next visit) and is likely to persist further. 
 
 
Study 2.3: Beliefs about Relationship between Price Magnitude and Price Dispersion 
Predict Differences in Search Persistence 
 
If, as I propose, people's beliefs about the relationship between price magnitude and 
price dispersion influence search persistence, differences in search persistence should be 
observed based on the heterogeneity of these beliefs across people. If, for example, a 
consumer is searching for a good price for a product that has an average price of 
$15,000, her expectations for the price dispersion around $15,000 should influence her 
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search persistence. If she believes that the dispersion in prices around $15,000 should 
equate to a standard deviation in prices of $2,000, but the actual standard deviation of 
prices is only $1,000, when she encounters a price that is actually a good deal (say, 
$13,500), she will be unlikely to perceive it to be a good deal, as her prior beliefs suggest 
that a better price could be found fairly easily. Conversely, if she believes that the 
dispersion should be $500, a price of $13,500 will seem like a much better deal than it 
actually is. This example is illustrated in the aforementioned Figure 2.6. 
 In the present study, I measure both beliefs about the relationship between price 
dispersion and price magnitude using a similar paradigm as in Study 2.2 and search 
persistence using a task similar to that in Study 2.1. I then examine the relationship 
between beliefs and search persistence and find the predicted correspondence: 
Participants who are projected to expect higher dispersion in the price search task persist 




 One hundred sixty participants, recruited through AMT, participated in this 
study. The study consisted of three parts. In part one, participants completed a price 
search task in the same format as Study 2.1 (i.e., searching multiple dealerships for a new 
car). The mean and standard deviation of the price distribution were the same for all 
participants (M = $15,000, SD = $1,000). (An exploratory factor was included in the 
price search task: whether the price was a single value or a combination of a price plus a 
discount. This factor did not produce any significant differences in search behavior and 
controlling for it does not change the experimental results reported hereafter.)  
 In part two, participants completed a task similar to Study 2.2, in which they are 
given the price someone paid for a product and asked to guess the absolute minimum 
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and maximum prices someone else has paid for the exact same product. An important 
change, however, is that participants were not told any information about the product: 
They are simply told, for example, “Someone just paid $312 for an item. What do you 
think the minimum price someone has paid for this item? What do you think the 
maximum price someone has paid for this item?” This removes the concern that the 
nature of the product (or product category) was driving the relationship observed in 
Study 2.2.  
 Finally, in part three, participants were asked a single exploratory item take from 
a standard maximizing tendency scale (Schwartz et al. 2002): “Do you agree with the 
following statement: I hold myself to a high standard?” This maximizing measure, 
perhaps surprisingly, did not correlate with search persistence (Spearman's ρ = -.04) and 




 Beliefs about Price Dispersion. I first examined the expected price dispersion 
participants reported at different price magnitudes. Not surprisingly, I find a similar 
pattern of results as in Study 2.2. As shown in Figure 2.7, participants believed that more 
expensive products would have greater price dispersion. For each participant, I regressed 
reported range (logged) on the provided price magnitude (also logged). As in Study 2.2, 
every participant (except one who reported zero expected range for each product and is 
thus removed from this and future analyses) expressed a positive relationship between 
price magnitude and price range. The median participant beta (.74, bootstrapped 95% CI 
[.70, .79]) was slightly smaller in this study than Study 2.2 (median = .88), 
corresponding to a slightly lower level of expected dispersion at a given price magnitude. 
This may be due to the task characteristics (i.e., that a specific product was indicated in 
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Study 2.2 and not in the current study) or may be due to population differences (i.e., 
different participants on a different day). 
 
 
Figure 2.7. The range of prices consumers predicted to exist in the marketplace for five 
unknown products given a single retail price (in log-log scale). Dots represent the 
median response, heavy black bars represent 50% of the data (the middle two quartiles), 
and light gray bars represent 90% of the data. 
 
 Relationship between Beliefs and Search Persistence. Although all participants 
indicated a positive relationship between price dispersion and price magnitude, there 
was substantial heterogeneity in these beliefs (range of participant betas [.03, .134]). 
Using the coefficients from the participant-level regressions, I projected the expected 
price dispersion for each participant at a price magnitude of $15,000 — the actual price 
magnitude used in the price search task (part one of the study). The median participant 
expected the range of prices at this magnitude to be $1,534, while the 25th-percential 
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participant expected a range of only $634 and the 75th-percential participant expected a 
range of $3,949. 
 I then examined how these expected differences in price dispersion corresponded 
to search persistence. As predicted, there was a significant positive relationship between 
expected price dispersion and depth of search in the price search task (Spearman's ρ = 
.21, bootstrapped 95% CI [.05, .36]; search persistence data from five participants are 
unavailable due to a programming error; all 154 remaining participants engaged in some 
search). Participants who expected more price dispersion at $15,000 (median split) 
searched more options (median = 14, bootstrapped 95% CI [12, 16]) than those who 
expected less price dispersion (median = 9, bootstrapped 95% CI [8, 12]; 97% of 
bootstrapped samples revealed a positive difference between the groups). The 
relationship between expected price dispersion and search depth is illustrated in Figure 
2.8. 
 A possible concern with the study design is that participants completed both 
tasks in the same session and might make inferences about the second task based on 
aspects of the first task. Specifically, the variance in prices a participant observes in the 
first task (the price search task) might influence her estimates of price dispersion in the 
second task (the belief elicitation task). A participant who (by chance) observed less price 
variance in the first task might search less in that task (the normative response) and 
might also indicate expecting less variance at a given price in the belief elicitation task. 
This process would produce the observed effect in this study. However, the data suggest 
this is not the case: The correlation between the variance of observed prices in task one 
and the price dispersion beliefs expressed in task two (operationalized as the projected 
price dispersion at $15,000) was negative, not positive as the alternative account would 
require (Spearman's ρ = -.17). 
 




Figure 2.8. Median search depth by price-dispersion expectations. Participants were 
binned into five quintiles based on the price dispersion they were projected to expect at 
$15,000. Participants with the lowest expected dispersion are in the “1st Quintile” and 
participants with the highest expected dispersion are in the “5th Quintile.” Dots 
represent the median search depth for each bin (N = 30 or 31) and the gray bars 
represent the bootstrapped 68% confidence interval for the median (which approximates 
the standard error). Note there is an increasing trend: Those participants who expected 




 In Study 2.3, I provide evidence that a consumer's expected price dispersion at a 
given price magnitude influences search persistence at that price magnitude. 
Participants in the study who believed there would be greater price dispersion for a 
product with the mean price of $15,000 searched more retailers (in this case car 
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dealerships) than those who expected less price dispersion. In the following study, I 
examine how these beliefs about price dispersion (i.e., how it relates to price magnitude) 
influence search behavior in various environments. These beliefs should lead to behavior 
consistent with microeconomic models of search when the environment corresponds to 
beliefs (i.e., when more expensive products have greater price dispersion). However, 
when the environment violates consumers' prior beliefs (i.e., when less expensive 
products have greater price dispersion), it is not clear whether (or how quickly) 
consumers will update their expectations about price dispersion when faced with belief 
inconsistent information (i.e., the first prices they encounter). 
 
 
Study 2.4: Simultaneous Price Search in Different Dispersion Environments 
 
In this study, I utilize a new paradigm in which participants simultaneously search for 
good prices for two different products. Searching for multiple products at the same time 
is a common occurrence in daily life. For example, booking a business trip often involves 
simultaneously searching for a flight, rental car, and hotel. Likewise, trips to the grocery 
store usually consist of looking for good deals on multiple different products. Besides 
being externally valid, this paradigm allows me to observe the same participant 
searching through two different price distributions. This within-participant design yields 
several benefits. 
 First, I am able to vary both price magnitude and price dispersion within 
participant. This allows for more powerful statistical tests because I am able to control 
for each individual participant's tendency to persist at search. Further, this design gives 
the participant a better chance at determining the relative value of search for each 
product. After seeing several prices for each product, a perceptive participant could infer 
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which of the two products is likely to have greater price dispersion (and thus should 
receive more search effort). In fact, after observing only three prices for each product, 
the observed standard deviations will indicate for which product search will be more 
profitable 80% of the time (based on the distribution parameters used in the study). 
Thus, the design provides participants with a realistic opportunity to quickly acquire 
information about the relative value of search and allocate their effort accordingly. In 
this sense, observing variance neglect in this paradigm is stronger evidence that 
consumers are failing to use the available diagnostic cues to determine their persistence 
in price search. 
 A second, related, benefit is that searching for one product in this design entails 
an opportunity cost that I (as the researcher) am able to observe. Specifically, the 
participant can be seen as allocating search effort between the two products. Effort 
allocated to searching for one of the products is effort not allocated to searching for the 
other product. I am thus able to quantify the misallocation of search effort for each 
consumer and — counterfactually — to estimate how much each participant could have 
saved by allocating her search effort more appropriately. 
 A final benefit is that, between participants, I am able to manipulate the “state of 
the world” for each consumer. Specifically, I am able to manipulate the relationship 
between price magnitude and price dispersion across the two products. For some 
participants, price magnitude will correlate positively with price dispersion (i.e., the 
more expensive product will have greater price dispersion). This “state of the world” 
should match participants' prior expectations. Thus, participants who based their search 
persistence on price magnitude should exhibit behavior consistent with the prescriptions 
of normative models of search (i.e., more search for the product with more price 
dispersion). However, for other participants, price magnitude will correlate negatively 
with price dispersion. Based on their expectations, participants should be predisposed to 
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search more for the higher priced product (which in this case will have lower price 
dispersion). I am able to observe whether participants in this condition update their 
beliefs and adjust their search strategies accordingly. 
 As I have argued, inferring price dispersion from price magnitude is ecologically 
rational: Typically, higher priced products will have higher price variance. However, 
there are exceptions to this rule. For example, in the data collected by Pratt, Wise, and 
Zeckhauser (1979), a Raleigh Grand Prix is a relatively expensive product (M = $145) 
with relatively low price dispersion (SD = $6) and a canvas cover for a truck is a 
relatively cheap product (M = $40) with relatively high price dispersion (SD = $29). If 
participants can detect these less common cases during price search, they can save both 
time and money. This experiment is able to test whether consumers can identify these 




 Two hundred participants, recruited from AMT, completed this study as part of a 
larger block of studies (one participant could not be matched to a response and is thus 
excluded from the analyses; two additional participants did not engage in any search and 
are also excluded). Participants were given a similar description of the price search task 
as in previous studies with one critical exception: Participants were told they would be 
searching for two flights simultaneously. (Flights were used in this study instead of cars 
to better fit the experimental paradigm of simultaneous search.) The flights were 
described as different legs for the same trip. Further, participants were provided a 
monetary incentive to try to find a good deal: Five participants who found “good prices” 
would receive a $2 bonus payment after the task. (I awarded the bonus payment to the 
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five best performers relative to their experimental condition.) The experimental interface 
is shown in Figure 2.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.9. Experiment interface used in Study 2.4. 
 
 In the flight search task, participants searched simultaneously for a high priced 
flight (prices drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of $1,200) and a low priced 
flight (prices drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of $600). Order of the 
flights on the screen was counterbalanced. The dispersion of the flight prices 
(operationalized as the standard deviation of the price distributions) varied by 
experimental condition. Participants were randomly assigned to one condition in a 2 
(dispersion for high priced flight: high (SD = $90) vs. low (SD = $45)) × 2 (dispersion for 
low priced flight: high (SD = $90) vs. low (SD = $45)) design.  
 The experimental design yielded two conditions (“states of the world”) in which 
both flights had equal price dispersion: a “high dispersion” condition (SD = $90 for 
both) and a “low dispersion” condition (SD = $45 for both). The design also yielded two 
conditions (“states of the world”) in which the flights had unequal price dispersion. In 
one of these conditions, the differences in price dispersion matched participant 
expectations: The more expensive flight had greater price dispersion (SD = $90) and the 
cheaper flight had less price dispersion (SD = $45). In the other condition, the 
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differences in price dispersion violated participant expectations: The more expensive 
flight had less price dispersion (SD = $45) and the cheaper flight had greater price 
dispersion (SD = $90). 
  The expected marginal return from search is greater when price dispersion is 
higher. Thus, when comparing the two equal price dispersion conditions, participants 
should search more when the price dispersion is greater for both flights compared to 
when it is smaller. However, if — as I propose — participants enter the task with 
expectations of price dispersion (based on the price magnitudes) and insufficiently 
adjust from these beliefs, the opposite behavior should emerge: Participants should 
search more when price dispersion is smaller for both options. 
 When comparing the two unequal price dispersion conditions, the economic 
prescription is that participants should search more for the high dispersion flight 
(regardless of whether it is the more or less expensive flight). In fact, the optimal ratio of 
search should favor the higher dispersion option approximately 2-to-1 (in aggregate). 
When the more expensive flight has greater price dispersion, the environment should 
match the expectations of participants and thus I expect their behavior to approximate 
the normative prescription. Because this is the typical state of the environment, this 
would be evidence that a heuristic for estimating dispersion by price magnitude is 
ecologically rational. That is, given the typical state of a consumer's environment, 
determining search persistence by price magnitude will usually yield sensible results. 
 While normative search theory and the proposed dispersion expectation theory 
make the same prediction for the condition in which the environment matches 
expectations, the predictions from the two theories diverge for the condition in which the 
environment contradicts expectations. When the cheaper flight has greater price 
dispersion, normative models of search would prescribe focusing search effort on this 
option (again, at approximately a 2-to-1 ratio). However, if beliefs about the expected 
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dispersion guide search persistence, participants would still be predisposed to search 
more for the higher priced option (which happens to be low in price dispersion). It is 
unclear whether participants will learn from feedback and adjust their beliefs leading to 
behavior more inline with normative predictions. Or, alternatively, if their initial beliefs 
will persist and they will search even more for the high priced flight (because it will take 
even longer to find a price that is good based on their prior beliefs) and even less for the 
low priced flight (because they will find a good price based on their prior beliefs quickly). 
 In sum, economic theory always prescribes more search when price dispersion is 
higher. However, if — as I propose — consumers form an inference about the expected 
price dispersion based on price magnitude, you should expect: (1) participants to search 
more for the higher priced flight compared to the lower priced flight (within-subject), (2) 
participants to search more in aggregate when both flights have low price dispersion 
compared to when both flights have high price dispersion (between-subjects), and (3) 
participants to approximate the normative economic predictions when the “state of the 
world” features a positive correlation between price magnitude and price dispersion. For 
the condition in which the “state of the world” violates participants' expectations (i.e., 
price magnitude and price dispersion are negatively correlated), it is not clear based on 
the proposed inference theory how participants will behave. The environment provides 
participants with the opportunity to learn that their a priori beliefs are incorrect (and 




 As a first level of analysis, I examined search persistence for the high priced and 
low priced flights irrespective of experimental condition. Replicating the result pattern 
from Study 2.1, participants searched significantly more options for the higher priced 
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flight (median = 12, bootstrapped 95% CI [11, 14]) than the lower priced flight (median = 
7, bootstrapped 95% CI [5, 9]; 99.99% of bootstrapped samples revealed a positive 
difference). Further, within the higher priced flight, participants searched more options 
when the price dispersion was smaller (median = 14, bootstrapped 95% CI [11, 15]) than 
when dispersion was greater (median = 11, bootstrapped 95% CI [10, 13]; 86% of 
bootstrapped samples revealed a positive difference). Similarly, within the lower priced 
flight, participants searched more options when the price dispersion was smaller 
(median = 9, bootstrapped 95% CI [6.5, 10]) than when dispersion was greater (median 
= 5, bootstrapped 95% CI [4, 8]; 96% of bootstrapped samples revealed a positive 
difference). These differences — which are the opposite of the behavior prescribed by 
normative search theory — also replicate the pattern of results from Study 2.1. The 
results by condition are shown graphically in Figure 2.10. 
   
 
Figure 2.10. Search depth by condition in Study 2.4. Each participant searched 
simultaneously for a high priced flight (M = $1,200) and a low priced flight (M = $600). 
Thus each condition is represented by two dots representing the median search 
persistence for each of the two flights. Bars approximate the standard error 
(bootstrapped 68% confidence interval). 
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 As a second level analysis, I examined search differences across both flights in the 
different dispersion environments. First, I looked at the two conditions in which both 
flights had equal price dispersion (left panel of Figure 2.10). When price dispersion was 
higher for both flights, participants — violating the prescription of normative search 
theory — searched less than when price dispersion was lower for both flights. In the high 
dispersion environment, the median search depth was 10 (bootstrapped 95% CI [8, 12]) 
for the more expensive flight and 6 (bootstrapped 95% CI [4, 9]) for the cheaper flight. In 
the low dispersion environment, the median search depth was 12 (bootstrapped 95% CI 
[10, 15.5]) for the more expensive flight and 9 (bootstrapped 95% CI [6, 10]) for the 
cheaper flight. 94% of bootstrapped samples revealed greater median search (summed) 
for the two flights in the low dispersion environment compared to the higher dispersion 
environment. This result is consistent with the proposed inferential process: When 
dispersion exceeded expectations, consumers searched less presumably because they 
were able to find an acceptable price (with respect to the price dispersion they inferred) 
in fewer searches. 
 I next looked at search differences across both flights in the two conditions with 
unequal price dispersion (right panel of Figure 2.10). In the condition where price 
dispersion matched expectations (i.e., the more expensive flight had greater price 
dispersion), participants — correctly, according to normative theory — indeed searched 
more for the flight with more price dispersion (median difference = 4, bootstrapped 95% 
CI [1.5, 8]). However, participants in the condition where price dispersion violated 
expectations (i.e., the more expensive flight had smaller price dispersion), participants — 
incorrectly, according to normative theory — searched less for the flight with more 
dispersion (median difference = -9, bootstrapped 95% CI [-12.5, -6]). Instead of shifting 
their search effort to the more profitable search option (which, in this case was the lower 
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priced flight because it featured greater price dispersion), they instead focused their 
search effort on the less profitable option. Seventy-five percent of participants in this 
condition searched more for the low dispersion option compared to the high dispersion 
option. 
 When participants were placed in an environment that did not match their 
expectations (i.e., where price magnitude was negatively correlated with price 
dispersion), they failed to efficiently update their beliefs. Most participants had ample 
information — if they chose to attend to it — to learn that the lower priced product had 
more price dispersion (median observed SD = $94 for the lower priced product vs. $43 
for the higher priced product). Instead of adapting their search strategy based on this 
information, they instead searched even more for the higher priced product (vs. the 
lower priced product) compared to participants in the condition in which the 
environment matched their prior expectations (median difference between search depth 
for high and low priced flights between conditions = 5, bootstrapped 95% CI [-0.5, 9.5]). 
This result is consistent with past research on “sticky” decision makers: Consumers 
frequently adopt a strategy for dealing with a specific decision which then persists to 
subsequent, often unrelated, decisions (Amir and Levav 2008; Broder and Schiffer 2006; 
Evangelidis and Levav 2013; Levav, Reinholtz, and Lin 2012; Luchins 1942). 
 I ran a counterfactual simulation to determine how much each participant could 
have saved by adopting a more appropriate search strategy. Holding their “search 
budget” constant (i.e., the total number of times they searched for both flights combined) 
and simply allocating equal search effort to both products would have saved the average 
participant $44 (the average price paid for both flights was $1650) in the condition 
where the environment violated prior expectations. In sum, variance neglect is persistent 
and costly even in environments where a direct comparison of variance can be made to a 
reference product. 




 Study 2.4 replicates the basic results from Study 2.1: Participants tend to search 
more when price magnitude is higher and tend to search less when price dispersion is 
lower. Further, this study illustrates how these heuristics can be ecologically rational: 
When the environment features a positive correlation between price magnitude and 
price dispersion, the behavior of participants approximates the normative prescriptions. 
However, when the environment violates participant expectations (i.e., a negative 
correlation between price magnitude and price dispersion), participants adjust their 
search effort allocation in the opposite manner prescribed by economic theory. In other 
words, they search even more for the high priced option when the price dispersion is 
lower and search even less for the low priced option when price dispersion is higher. This 
result can be seen as participants insufficiently updating their beliefs and, instead of 
recognizing that their a priori conceptions of a good deal are suboptimal, accepting a 
price too quickly for the high dispersion (low priced) option and persisting too much at 





Summary and Implications 
 
 In this chapter, I argue that consumers have prior beliefs about what price 
dispersion to expect at a given price magnitude. In other words, when a consumer is 
looking for the best deal for a given product, she will form a representation about how 
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the prices are likely to vary (in absolute magnitude) based on the average price (or first 
price) for that product. For more expensive products, consumers expect higher price 
variation. I argue that these beliefs, in turn, influence search persistence. When a 
consumer believes the price dispersion is greater than it actually is, she will likely persist 
too long at search. This is because the prices she encounters — even if they are good 
deals compared to the actual prices at other retailers — will not seem very good based on 
her prior expectations. Further, when a consumer believes that price dispersion is 
smaller than it actually is, she will exhibit the opposite behavior: She will likely accept an 
early encountered price that is only a marginal deal (by the standards of the actual prices 
available) because it will seem like an excellent deal based on her prior expectations. 
 Forming an expectation of price dispersion based on the average price is, for the 
most part, a reasonable heuristic. Price magnitude and price dispersion are strongly 
correlated in the marketplace. Further, judgments of averages are much easier to make 
(and more accurate) than those of variance (Beach and Scopp 1968), so a heuristically 
linking the two provides for cognitive efficiency. The problem with these expectations 
arises in two cases: (1) When a less expensive product has high price dispersion, 
consumers will often under-search and miss out on potentially large savings. (2) When a 
more expensive product has low price dispersion, consumers will often over-search and 
waste time and — sometimes — money. 
 Highlighting the second issue, many manufacturers of high priced products have 
adopted retail price management strategies, effectively limiting the dispersion in prices 
across retailers. One prominent practitioner of this strategy is Apple. Apple products 
tend to be expensive and feature limited price dispersion across retailers. One 
implication of this research is that consumers are likely over-searching for a good price 
on Apple products. Anecdotal evidence for this can be seen in Google Trends: Despite 
being purchased less often, the average frequency of search (in the United States) on 
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Google Shopping for the keyword “iPhone” is about seven times greater than the 
frequency of search for the keyword “Android.” Including “price” as an additional search 
term reveals an even stronger difference (a 22-to-1 ratio). 
 
Psychophysics of Price 
 
 Previous research has suggested that relative — not absolute — savings motivate 
consumer search. For example, people expressed a higher willingness to incur the cost of 
a 20-minute commute to save $5 on a $15 calculator than to save $5 on a $125 calculator 
(Thaler 1985; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Building from this research, Grewal and 
Marmorstein put forth a psychophysics-of-price hypothesis: “Consumers' willingness to 
spend time comparing prices to achieve a fixed amount of price savings is negatively 
related to the price of the item” (1994, p. 155). Indeed, consumers who had just 
purchased a durable item at a higher cost expressed a lower willingness to spend time to 
save an addition fixed amount (either $20 or $40). 
 The implications of the current investigation are largely consistent with these 
prior results. Indeed, participants in the previously described studies seemed less 
satisfied (measured by likelihood to continue search) with a fixed absolute discount from 
the mean price when the mean price was higher. However, there are several differences 
between my results and the results of the previous studies. First, in the current study I 
separate the effect of price magnitude and price variation. Second, I provide a belief-
based explanation for why people may be willing to exert more search effort for higher 
priced items (Studies 2.2 and 2.3). Third, I am looking at a repeated observation search 
problem as opposed to one time choice, addressing and entirely different research 
question of stopping time based on price dispersion. Fourth, the current investigation 
presents a more optimistic view of consumer behavior: Participants in my studies were 
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more willing to expend search energy for more expensive priced products holding price 
dispersion constant. So while a consumer might not want to drive 20 minutes to save $5 
on a $125 calculator compared to a $15 calculator, my research suggests that the same 
consumer is more willing to search extensively for that same $125 calculator than she 
would be for the $15 model. 
 
References Prices in Search 
 
 Previous research has also suggested that reference prices can lead to 
asymmetries in consumer search. Specifically, consumers have been shown to search 
more when they encounter prices above an established reference and less when they 
encounter prices below an established reference (McGee 2012). This finding is supported 
by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), which suggests that a loss of a fixed 
amount is more psychologically impactful than a gain of the same magnitude. The 
present investigation does not involve clear reference points, so it is unclear how 
reference effects could manifest in the observed results. If the first (or mean) price serves 
as a reference point, it is not clear why differences in search would be observed based on 
price magnitude. Alternatively, as mentioned in the previous section, the presented 
results are consistent with consumers having very low reference point and a concave 
value function. However, this account does not provide a direct explanation for the 
accuracy of consumers' price dispersion beliefs nor the correlation between these beliefs 
and search behavior. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
 
 While the previous studies show a robust empirical trend in consumer search that 
contradicts predictions from normative search models, a few limitations should be 
mentioned. First — and most critically — the incentive for participants to find a good 
price is not always clear. For a consumer shopping for a real product, increasing search 
will (probabilistically) decrease the amount of money she will pay (and thus give up) 
upon purchase. Although I use an incentive compatible design in Study 2.4, it is unlikely 
to produce the same psychological impact as the prospect of saving/spending more 
significant sums of money. Future studies will attempt to address this issue by endowing 
participants with money at the start of the experiment and having them “spend” that 
money on the items for which they search. By allowing them to keep what they save, the 
experiments will more closely mimic actual consumer price search.  
 A related criticism involves the paradigm used and the extent to which it is 
externally valid. It is worth considering whether “search” in my experiments 
appropriately captures the relevant dynamics of real consumer search. I chose a 
paradigm that closely adhered to the assumptions typically made in the economics 
literature (e.g., known search cost, homogenous products), but future research should 
examine whether consumers behave differently when some of these parameters are 
relaxed (e.g., searching through different products from the same product category). 
 Future research should also address more directly the process of belief updating. 
In Studies 2.2 and 2.3, I provide evidence that consumers make price dispersion 
inferences based on price magnitude. Further I show that these inferences are predictive 
of search persistence. However, I do not show the process of how — if at all — consumers 
update their beliefs in response to observed prices. Beliefs must be updated to some 
extent, or else situations could arise in which participants would search indefinitely (i.e., 
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a product with absolutely no variation in price across retailers). Study 2.4 suggests this 
updating process is likely to be slow, but more careful examination is warranted. 
 Finally, besides normative factors, there are many psychologically interesting 
variables that can be examined in the price search context. Future research could 
compare, for example, differences in price search behavior when the product is needed 
(e.g., a car repair) versus simply desired (e.g., a new record album). Other potentially 
interesting factors include temporal distance (e.g., searching for something to use now 
vs. later), gain-loss framing (e.g., searching through discounts vs. prices), reference 
points (e.g., previous prices paid), and product familiarity (e.g., is it a product for which 




 Economic treatments of search theory and optimal stopping suggest that price 
dispersion should be the predominant determiner of consumer search. When price 
dispersion is higher, the marginal expected benefit of additional search is greater. 
However, I find that consumers do not follow this economic prescription. In fact, 
consumers tend to search less when price dispersion is greater and search more 
extensively for more expensive products, another deviation from normative search 
prescriptions. I propose that consumers' beliefs about the relationship between price 
magnitude and price dispersion can explain both of these results. Specifically, I argue 
that given a price magnitude, participants expect a certain level of price variation. This 
expected variation increases with price magnitude. Typically, these beliefs serve the 
consumer well, but when the environment violates consumer expectations they can lead 
to the accrual of unnecessary search costs or the failure to reap substantial savings. 
	   77	  
 The results in this chapter can inform managerial decisions regarding product 
pricing and promotion. An obvious implication is that retailers (and product managers) 
should expect customers to search more for higher priced products. A retailer in 
competition with a neighboring store might be well served by offering the best price on 
the more expensive products, but offering a slightly higher price (comparatively) on the 
cheaper products (as consumers will be less likely to search for these). A second potential 
implication involves pricing strategies. Brands that employ retail price management 
strategies (such as Apple) — and thus have less price dispersion for their products — 
might be best served making this clear to their customers. The present research suggests 
that a consumer who wants to buy an Apple computer might spend an extensive period 
searching for the best price (as she will expect more dispersion than actually exists). 
Some potential purchases may be lost during this period of search if the customer 
become frustrated or finds a competing product with a better price. By making it clear 
that the customer is unlikely to find a price below the suggested retail price, brands like 
Apple could try to persuade customers to limit their search effort. A final managerial 
implication involves advertising. A retailer might benefit from advertising their store in 
conjunction with their prices for high price, low dispersion products. As consumers will 
tend to search more for these products, this might be a way to get noticed by potential 
customers who are unfamiliar with the retailer. Although this might not translate into 
sales of the advertised product, it may have downstream benefits in terms of brand 
recognition and store consideration. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
A Cognitive Model of Persistence in Consumer Price Search 
 
Consumers frequently engage in price search: The process of looking for a good price for 
a product or service they plan to purchase. For example, a consumer might know the 
exact type of computer she wants to buy, but does not know which retailer will sell it for 
the lowest price. She must then undergo a process of visiting retailers (“visiting” here can 
mean driving to the store, calling for a price quote, or simply accessing a website) to 
determine the possible prices available. The more retailers a consumer visits, the better 
price — on average — she will find. However, visiting retailers entails a cost (in time 
and/or money). The important tradeoff in price search is whether the expected marginal 
benefit of visiting another store (and possibly finding a better price) is greater than the 
expected cost of visiting that store. When the cost exceeds the expected benefit, a 
consumer should stop and select the best price she has previously seen. 
 Economic models have been developed for how consumers should conduct price 
search (e.g., Rothschild 1974; Stigler 1961). Yet consumers frequently violate the 
prescriptions of these models. Specifically, consumers have been observed to search 
more for higher priced products and products with less price dispersion (see Chapter 2). 
Consumers have also been shown to search more above a reference point than below 
(McGee 2012) and to be unduly influenced by recently seen options (Häubl, Delleart, and 
Donkers 2012). 
 In this chapter I develop the framework for a cognitively plausible model of 
consumer price search. At the core of the model is a process by which consumers are 
assumed to generate and update a reference distribution of possible prices. The reference 
distribution is assumed to be discrete and finite (i.e., composed of a sample of possible 
prices) and consumers are assumed to search until a previously seen price achieves a 
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sufficient rank in the reference distribution (e.g., better than 90%). I describe the model 
and necessary parameters in a subsequent section. 
 The model proposed in this chapter is able to account for many of the “mistakes” 
consumers make with respect to normative models. The proposed distribution 
generation process provides an explanation for the observed influences of price 
magnitude and price dispersion. Holding price dispersion constant, the model predicts 
more search when price magnitude is higher. Holding price magnitude constant, the 
model predicts more search when price dispersion is lower. Further, the proposed 
distribution updating process provides an explanation for local contrast effects (i.e., the 
overweighting of recently encounter prices; Häubl, Delleart, and Donkers 2012) and the 
proposed generating process can account for reference point effects (McGee 2012). 
 
 
Mental Representations of Statistical Distributions 
 
Humans live in a stochastic world. Almost every choice — from choosing the best way to 
get home from work to choosing the best way to invest for retirement — involves a 
probabilistic component. Critically, the outcome space for most of these decisions is 
continuous: the length of a delay caused by rush hour traffic or the percent return for a 
given mutual fund. Yet the question of how humans represent knowledge of probability 
distributions (vs. binary probabilities) has received surprisingly little academic attention. 
 Past research has examined this question (indirectly, perhaps) using different 
methods to elicit a decision maker's subjective probability distribution (e.g., Garthwaite, 
Kadane, and O'Hagan 2005). Results suggest that a decision maker can fairly accurately 
retrieve (or construct) the central tendency (specifically the median or mode) of a 
represented probability distribution (Beach and Swenson 1966; Peterson and Miller 
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1964; Spencer 1961). However, attempts to accurately elicit the variance of a represented 
distribution have proved more difficult (e.g., Beach and Scopp 1968). A popular 
technique for attempting to elicit variance estimates involves asking participants for 
credible intervals (e.g., the upper and lower bound for 50% of the distribution). 
Participants in these studies tend to be overconfident, expressing intervals that are too 
small (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips 1982). 
 Research work, however, has shown that decision makers can express fairly 
accurate estimates of statistical variance when given the appropriate response format. 
Specifically, participants are quite adept at reconstructing a discrete distribution from 
memory when they are able to do so using a graphical interface (Goldstein and Rothchild 
2014). Using a “balls and bins” type interface (Delavande and Rohwedder 2008), 
participants recreated distributions from which the mean and variance was calculated. 
These calculated estimates were much closer to those of the actual empirical distribution 
compared to estimates of mean and variance from the more common point and interval 
techniques. 
 In sum, previous research suggests that humans do not represent continuous 
probability distributions in terms of parameters such as mean and variance. 
Alternatively, it seems possible that humans represent continuous probability 
distributions as finite sets of discrete outcomes. This notion is consistent with recent 
models of decision making that posit humans make choices by retrieving only a limited 
number of items from memory (Giguère and Love 2013; Nosofsky and Palmeri 1997; 
Stewart, Chater, and Brown 2006). 
 In the model I describe in the next section, I assume that consumers indeed 
represent probability distributions as finite sets of possible outcomes. Specifically, I 
assume that consumers represent the distribution of possible prices for a product in the 
marketplace as a limited number of specific prices.  
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A Model of Consumer Price Search 
 
In this section, I describe a computational process that can be used to model the 
behavior of consumers undertaking price search. Although I make assumptions in this 
model that are cognitively plausible (i.e., a human decision make could carry out the 
computations; see Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Goldstein 2008 for further discussion 
about cognitive plausibility), I do not mean to suggest that this model replicates the exact 
process by which consumers carry out price search. By specifying a model, I do — 





 A key aspect of the proposed model is the reference distribution. When 
conducting price search, the consumer is assumed to possess a mental representation of 
the possible dispersion of prices that could exist in the marketplace. This distribution is 
assumed to be discrete and finite. In other words, it is composed of a set of N possible 
prices. For simplicity, I will call the specific prices in the reference distribution 
“particles” — a reference to particle filtering models of Bayesian updating (e.g., Pitt and 
Shephard 1999). The reference distribution of particles is updated upon seeing new 
prices and used to evaluate whether the current price (or a previously seen price) is good 
enough to merit stopping search.  
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 Distribution Generation. If the consumer begins a price search task without any 
prior knowledge about the existent prices in the marketplace, I propose that the 
reference distribution of particles is created from N draws from a normal distribution 
with mean equal to the first price encountered and a standard deviation that is a function 
of the first price encountered. Specifically, I propose that the generating distribution will 
have: 
𝑀   =   𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸! 
 
𝑆𝐷 = 𝑒!!!(!"(!"#$%!)) 
 
 This generating distribution is consistent with the power law relationship 
between price magnitude and price dispersion that has previously been documented in 
the marketplace (Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser 1979). More importantly, it is consistent 
with consumer expectations for price dispersion as elicited from a single price (see 
Chapter 2, Studies 2.2 and 2.3). 
 Two alternative cases merit brief discussion: (1) If a consumer has a reference 
price in mind (or one is provided), the reference price should be used to populate the 
initial price dispersion representation (instead of the first price encountered). (2) If 
consumers begin price search with specific expectations regarding the price dispersion 
for a given product/service, the initial distribution should be a function of these 
expectations. Methods to determine these specific expectations should be developed, but 
preliminary estimates can be acquired by surveying the actual price dispersion for the 
product/service in the marketplace and randomly sampling N of these prices to serve as 
the initial distribution of particles. 
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 Distribution Updating. When the consumer encounters a new price, I assume the 
reference distribution is updated to account for this new information. The updating 
process consists of two steps: 
 First, the old distribution “decays.” In other words, some of the previous N 
particles are removed/deleted from the represented price distribution. I propose 
modeling the processes as a fixed probability of decay for each particle (λrep). Thus, the 
probability that any given particle leaves the reference distribution is λrep and the 
probability that it remains in the distribution is 1- λrep. 
 After some of the particles decay, I propose they are replaced through a similar 
process that generated the initial distribution. Replacement particles are randomly 
drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of the most recently seen price (i.e., M = 
PRICEi) and a standard deviation that is a function of the most recently seen price (i.e., 
SD = e α+β ln(PRICEi) ). Thus with each newly seen price, the central tendency of the 




 In this model, the decision to terminate search and select a previously seen price 
is governed by a threshold rule. The threshold, τ, is not based on a specific price, but 
rather based rank in the reference distribution. If the lowest price a consumer has 
observed is better than τ particles in the reference distribution, the consumer will stop 
search and select that best price. 
 An additional parameter can be included in the model if previously seen prices 
must be stored in the consumer's memory. This parameter, λmem, represents the decay of 
previously seen prices in a consumer's memory and functions much like the decay 
parameter in the particle distribution. Each time the consumer sees a new price, the 
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previously seen prices which remain in memory have a probability of λmem of being 
forgotten. The stopping rule then becomes whether the minimum remembered price is 





In this chapter, I motivate and define and computational model to approximate human 
behavior in price search. The proposed model can account for many of the observed 
deviations from normative search theory. First, because the variance of the generated 
reference distribution is a function of price magnitude, the model predicts less search 
when price magnitude is lower (holding price dispersion constant) and more search 
when price dispersion is lower (holding price magnitude constant). Second, because the 
reference distribution moves towards recently seen prices, local contrasts (i.e., the 
difference between subsequent prices) can influence stopping decisions. Finally, if a 
reference price is used to form the initial distribution, the model predicts more search 
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